![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
There was some major confusion a couple of hours ago. First, an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesman told the wire services that Israeli troops had entered southern Lebanon. Then IDF officials denied it. Then it was announced that bulldozers had gone in and had been withdrawn. We went from thinking the invasion had begun to that it hadn't to "what in the world is going on?"
Our best guess at the moment is that the bulldozers went in to clear mines and other obstacles prior to the main body of Israeli forces crossing over tonight. Another explanation might be that this was a probe designed to draw Hezbollah fire. The Israelis are clearly worried that Hezbollah has obtained advanced weaponry from Iran via the sea and Syria. They don't seem to be sure what has arrived and what has deployed with Hezbollah forces, but they don't want to push across the border only to have their armor caught in a hail of advanced anti-tank missiles or trapped by advanced anti-tank mines. There also could be an element of psychological warfare in this confusion. Hezbollah knows Israel is coming but doesn't know when -- and Israel wants to rattle its fighters as much as possible.
All of this is possible, but the fact is that major Israeli forces have not crossed the border into Lebanon as of afternoon July 17, local time. The Israelis did announce they were calling up a reserve division over the weekend. Meanwhile, Israeli aircraft are continuing intense operations over Lebanon. More Hezbollah rockets started hitting Israel after daybreak July 17. This obviously creates some urgency for the Israelis. The airstrikes have not succeeded in shutting down rockets that can reach as far as Haifa, and the Israelis have acknowledged that Tel Aviv is at risk as well. Therefore, where we have expected Israel to move as soon as possible, it has not yet committed forces on the ground.
One explanation could be that the Israelis simply are not ready to move yet. Deploying a force suitable for the mission takes time. The call-up of the reserve division by headquarters indicates that this is to be a substantial operation. The Israelis might not want ground forces to go until they are completely ready, and thus are prepared to absorb the additional hours or days of missile attack to make sure the attack is decisive.
A second possible explanation is that although the Israelis have lost any element of strategic surprise -- Hezbollah certainly knows they are coming -- they are hoping for some tactical surprise. The longer they delay, the less certain and more weary Hezbollah becomes. It is not clear, however, whether the advantage tied to any possibility of tactical surprise is worth the incoming missiles.
Third, it could be that the air campaign is not yet complete. Israel, like the United States, likes to shape the battlefield by running extensive air campaigns. There could be too many targets for such a campaign to have run its course yet, or the targets might be more robust than expected. The Israelis could be hunting for the longer-range missiles that Hezbollah has, fearing that an invasion before these are destroyed would invite a launch at Tel Aviv -- something they don't want to see.
Yet another reason for the delay might be something that Russian President Vladimir Putin hinted at July 16, when he said Russians had been negotiating for the release of the three kidnapped Israeli soldiers and that he did not feel the negotiations had been unsuccessful. Israel does want the soldiers returned. But while Hamas might consider releasing the captives in its custody, it is hard to believe Hezbollah would -- not if, after releasing them, Hezbollah would still face attacks.
There is massive diplomacy under way, and Israel is doing well. Not only is the United States lining up with Israel, but the sense at the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg, Russia, was much less hostile to Israel than normal. In addition, both the Saudis and Egyptians have made it clear that they hold Hezbollah responsible for what has happened. Given this, it is not inconceivable that some diplomatic process is actually moving forward.
The problem with that scenario is that any diplomatic settlement to the crisis not only would preserve Hezbollah in some way, but would depend on Hezbollah implementing an agreement. The Israelis see the situation that has erupted in recent days as a rare opportunity to deal with Hezbollah, and they have no trust in diplomatic arrangements or their enforcement by mediators. They do want their soldiers back, but not at the risk of leaving Hezbollah in place.
The fighting is hardly tapering off. Israel's aircraft are ranging over Lebanon, a blockade is in place, and Hezbollah is firing at northern Israel quite effectively. Israel will not willingly leave Hezbollah in place while it has such capabilities. The Israelis might leave all this to airpower, but the fact is that the Israeli army has no confidence in the air force's ability to definitively destroy Hezbollah. The view is that, in the end, they will have to go in on the ground.
It is interesting to note, however, that the United States is being surprisingly relaxed about getting American citizens out of Beirut. Obviously, it can't get everyone out, but unlike other countries, the United States has been slow to move, in spite of the obvious risk of hostage-taking. U.S. Embassy officials in Beirut seem to be acting as if they have more time -- and certainly the United States knows if and when Israel is going to invade.
Our view is this: Israel will not accept the bombardment that is under way. Any cease-fire, from the Israeli point of view, would simply be a postponement of the issue. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's government does not have the political freedom for action that a cease-fire requires. There is rare consensus in Israel that Hezbollah must be attacked. If Olmert settles for a diplomatic solution, he will have serious problems in the Knesset.
Therefore, it follows that the most likely explanation for the delay in a ground assault is that the Israelis are going to take some more time in deploying their forces at the border, allow the air campaign to continue for another day or two, accept the civilian casualties from Hezbollah's rockets and strike back some time this week. But with those rockets coming in, they don't have that many days to wait. Israel's government is not fractious. There is no sense of unease about the situation. Therefore, we have to stay with the view that a broader ground attack is likely early this week.
Our best guess at the moment is that the bulldozers went in to clear mines and other obstacles prior to the main body of Israeli forces crossing over tonight. Another explanation might be that this was a probe designed to draw Hezbollah fire. The Israelis are clearly worried that Hezbollah has obtained advanced weaponry from Iran via the sea and Syria. They don't seem to be sure what has arrived and what has deployed with Hezbollah forces, but they don't want to push across the border only to have their armor caught in a hail of advanced anti-tank missiles or trapped by advanced anti-tank mines. There also could be an element of psychological warfare in this confusion. Hezbollah knows Israel is coming but doesn't know when -- and Israel wants to rattle its fighters as much as possible.
All of this is possible, but the fact is that major Israeli forces have not crossed the border into Lebanon as of afternoon July 17, local time. The Israelis did announce they were calling up a reserve division over the weekend. Meanwhile, Israeli aircraft are continuing intense operations over Lebanon. More Hezbollah rockets started hitting Israel after daybreak July 17. This obviously creates some urgency for the Israelis. The airstrikes have not succeeded in shutting down rockets that can reach as far as Haifa, and the Israelis have acknowledged that Tel Aviv is at risk as well. Therefore, where we have expected Israel to move as soon as possible, it has not yet committed forces on the ground.
One explanation could be that the Israelis simply are not ready to move yet. Deploying a force suitable for the mission takes time. The call-up of the reserve division by headquarters indicates that this is to be a substantial operation. The Israelis might not want ground forces to go until they are completely ready, and thus are prepared to absorb the additional hours or days of missile attack to make sure the attack is decisive.
A second possible explanation is that although the Israelis have lost any element of strategic surprise -- Hezbollah certainly knows they are coming -- they are hoping for some tactical surprise. The longer they delay, the less certain and more weary Hezbollah becomes. It is not clear, however, whether the advantage tied to any possibility of tactical surprise is worth the incoming missiles.
Third, it could be that the air campaign is not yet complete. Israel, like the United States, likes to shape the battlefield by running extensive air campaigns. There could be too many targets for such a campaign to have run its course yet, or the targets might be more robust than expected. The Israelis could be hunting for the longer-range missiles that Hezbollah has, fearing that an invasion before these are destroyed would invite a launch at Tel Aviv -- something they don't want to see.
Yet another reason for the delay might be something that Russian President Vladimir Putin hinted at July 16, when he said Russians had been negotiating for the release of the three kidnapped Israeli soldiers and that he did not feel the negotiations had been unsuccessful. Israel does want the soldiers returned. But while Hamas might consider releasing the captives in its custody, it is hard to believe Hezbollah would -- not if, after releasing them, Hezbollah would still face attacks.
There is massive diplomacy under way, and Israel is doing well. Not only is the United States lining up with Israel, but the sense at the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg, Russia, was much less hostile to Israel than normal. In addition, both the Saudis and Egyptians have made it clear that they hold Hezbollah responsible for what has happened. Given this, it is not inconceivable that some diplomatic process is actually moving forward.
The problem with that scenario is that any diplomatic settlement to the crisis not only would preserve Hezbollah in some way, but would depend on Hezbollah implementing an agreement. The Israelis see the situation that has erupted in recent days as a rare opportunity to deal with Hezbollah, and they have no trust in diplomatic arrangements or their enforcement by mediators. They do want their soldiers back, but not at the risk of leaving Hezbollah in place.
The fighting is hardly tapering off. Israel's aircraft are ranging over Lebanon, a blockade is in place, and Hezbollah is firing at northern Israel quite effectively. Israel will not willingly leave Hezbollah in place while it has such capabilities. The Israelis might leave all this to airpower, but the fact is that the Israeli army has no confidence in the air force's ability to definitively destroy Hezbollah. The view is that, in the end, they will have to go in on the ground.
It is interesting to note, however, that the United States is being surprisingly relaxed about getting American citizens out of Beirut. Obviously, it can't get everyone out, but unlike other countries, the United States has been slow to move, in spite of the obvious risk of hostage-taking. U.S. Embassy officials in Beirut seem to be acting as if they have more time -- and certainly the United States knows if and when Israel is going to invade.
Our view is this: Israel will not accept the bombardment that is under way. Any cease-fire, from the Israeli point of view, would simply be a postponement of the issue. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's government does not have the political freedom for action that a cease-fire requires. There is rare consensus in Israel that Hezbollah must be attacked. If Olmert settles for a diplomatic solution, he will have serious problems in the Knesset.
Therefore, it follows that the most likely explanation for the delay in a ground assault is that the Israelis are going to take some more time in deploying their forces at the border, allow the air campaign to continue for another day or two, accept the civilian casualties from Hezbollah's rockets and strike back some time this week. But with those rockets coming in, they don't have that many days to wait. Israel's government is not fractious. There is no sense of unease about the situation. Therefore, we have to stay with the view that a broader ground attack is likely early this week.
Getting Ready - from Stratfor
Jul. 15th, 2006 10:59 pmWe are now in the period preceding major conventional operations. Israel is in the process of sealing the Lebanese coast. They have disrupted Lebanese telecommunications, although they have not completely collapsed the structure. Israeli aircraft are attacking Hezbollah's infrastructure and road system. In the meantime, Hezbollah, aware it is going to be hit hard, is in a use-it or-lose-it scenario, firing what projectiles it can into Israel.
The Israeli strategy appears to be designed to do two things. First, the Israelis are trying to prevent any supplies from entering Lebanon, including reinforcements. That is why they are attacking all coastal maritime facilities. Second, they are degrading the roads in Lebanon. That will keep reinforcements from reaching Hezbollah fighters engaged in the south. As important, it will prevent the withdrawal and redeployment of heavy equipment deployed by Hezbollah in the south, particularly their rockets, missiles and launchers. The Israelis are preparing the battlefield to prevent a Hezbollah retreat or maneuver.
Hezbollah's strategy has been imposed on it. It seems committed to standing and fighting. The rate of fire they are maintaining into Israel is clearly based on an expectation that Israel will be attacking. The rocketry guarantees the Israelis will attack. Hezbollah has been reported to have anti-tank and anti-air weapons. The Israelis will use airmobile tactics to surround and isolate Hezbollah concentrations, but in the end, they will have to go in, engage and defeat Hezbollah tactically. Hezbollah obviously knows this, but there is no sign of disintegration on its part. At the very least, Hezbollah is projecting an appetite for combat. Sources in Beirut, who have been reliable to this point, say Hezbollah has weapons that have not yet been seen, such as anti-aircraft missiles, and that these will be used shortly. Whatever the truth of this, Hezbollah does not seem to think its situation is hopeless.
The uncertain question is Syria. No matter how effectively Israel seals the Lebanese coast, so long as the Syrian frontier is open, Hezbollah might get supplies from there, and might be able to retreat there. So far, there has been only one reported airstrike on a Syrian target. Both Israel and Syria were quick to deny this.
What is interesting is that it was the Syrians who insisted very publicly that no such attack took place. The Syrians are clearly trying to avoid a situation in which they are locked into a confrontation with Israel. Israel might well think this is the time to have it out with Syria as well, but Syria is trying very hard not to give Israel casus belli. In addition, Syria is facilitating the movement of Westerners out of Lebanon, allowing them free transit. They are trying to signal that they are being cooperative and nonaggressive.
The problem is this: While Syria does not want to get hit and will not make overt moves, so long as the Syrians cannot guarantee supplies will not reach Hezbollah or that Hezbollah won't be given sanctuary in Syria, Israel cannot complete its mission of shattering Hezbollah and withdrawing. They could be drawn into an Iraq-like situation that they absolutely don't want. Israel is torn. On the one hand, it wants to crush Hezbollah, and that requires total isolation. On the other hand, it does not want the Syrian regime to fall. What comes after would be much worse from Israel's point of view.
This is the inherent problem built into Israel's strategy, and what gives Hezbollah some hope. If Israel does not attack Syria, Hezbollah could well survive Israel's attack by moving across the border. No matter how many roads are destroyed, Israel won't be able to prevent major Hezbollah formations moving across the border. If they do attack Syria and crush al Assad's government, Hezbollah could come out of this stronger than ever.
Judging from the airstrikes in the past 24 hours, it would appear Israel is trying to solve the problem tactically, by degrading Lebanese transport facilities. That could increase the effectiveness of the strategy, but in the end cannot be sufficient. We continue to think Israel will choose not to attack Syria directly and therefore, while the invasion will buy time, it will not solve the problem. Hezbollah certainly expects to be badly hurt, but it does not seem to expect to be completely annihilated. We are guessing, but our guess is that they are reading Israel's views on Syria and are betting that, in the long run, they will come out stronger. Of course, Israel knows this and therefore may have a different plan for Syria. At any rate, this is the great unknown in this campaign.
The other unknown is the withdrawal of Western nationals from Lebanon. We have received very reliable reports from sources in Lebanon who assure us Hezbollah does not intend to renew hostage taking, which is deemed an old and nonproductive strategy. These same sources have reported splits in Hezbollah over how aggressive it should be. We believe Hezbollah has no current plans for hostage taking. We are not convinced, however, that in the course of the battle it will not change its mind, or that with weakened central control elements, elements of Hezbollah will take hostages as a bargaining chip. Regardless of what Hezbollah is saying now, hostage taking must be taken seriously as a possibility.
The U.S. Embassy in Beirut is now saying plans are being developed in concert with the U.S. Defense Department for extracting U.S. nationals from Lebanon. A convoy scheduled to travel from the American University of Beirut to Amman, Jordan, via Syria, was cancelled at the last moment, with participants being told that the embassy has other plans.
There are said to be 25,000 U.S. citizens in Lebanon, but many of these are Lebanese-American dual nationals who actually live in Lebanon as Lebanese. These are less visible, less at risk and have greater resources for survival. The most at-risk Americans are those who hold only U.S. papers and are clearly American, such as employees of American companies, students studying at Lebanese universities and tourists. There is no clear count of these high-risk nationals, nor is there a count on high-risk nationals from other non-Islamic countries. There are thousands, however, and getting them out will be difficult.
The U.S. Embassy is considering flying them to Cyprus. That would mean an air bridge from Beirut International Airport, where a single runway has been opened, to Cyprus, a short flight away. The United States will not do this while Beirut is under attack, so it will ask the Israelis to create a safe zone and air corridor during the evacuation. But the threat on the ground is real, and we suspect the United States will send troops in to secure the perimeter and surrounding areas against shoulder-launched missiles. They will also keep the precise timing secret, although thousands of people in Lebanon -- the evacuees -- will know it is coming.
There was a Marine Expeditionary Force on maneuvers in the Red Sea a few days ago. We do not know where they are now, but they had 2,200 marines on board -- the right number to secure extraction. We suspect aircraft will be chartered from airlines in the region and that some U.S. Air Force and allied aircraft might also be used. Doubtless, the United States is busy organizing it. Given that the United States cancelled several ad hoc withdrawals, it must be highly confident it has the process nailed; we would expect this operation to get going sometime Sunday. Assuming aircraft that can carry any average of 200 people (purely arbitrary), 50-100 flights could get everyone out. Assuming that everyone can be notified and can get to Beirut International Airport. That won't happen. The remainder who are at risk will probably be advised to move into Christian areas east and northeast of Beirut and to keep their heads down for the duration. It is also possible that discussion of Cyprus notwithstanding, the path will be through Syria, but we doubt that.
In the meantime, that Israel has not sent major ground units into Lebanon yet (lots of small units are operating there) but is taking rocket attacks and hunkering down indicates it does not plan to act piecemeal. If we were to guess, the main thrust would likely begin late Sunday night or Monday morning. They will be ready by then. Of course we are not privy to Israeli operations, so it could be delayed 24-48 hours to give forces a chance to gear up. But given the Hezbollah bombardment, the Israelis are under pressure to move sooner rather than later.
We are in a relatively quiet spell (emphasis on quiet). Both sides have made their strategic decisions. Both know how the war will be fought. Hezbollah thinks it can give as good as it will get for a while, and will ultimately be able to regroup for a guerrilla war against the Israelis. Israel thinks it can immobilize and crush Hezbollah quickly and decisively and will be able to withdraw. Both sides know Syria is the wild card, and neither is quite sure how it will play its hand. One side is wrong in its expectations about the outcome. That's the nature of war.
The Israeli strategy appears to be designed to do two things. First, the Israelis are trying to prevent any supplies from entering Lebanon, including reinforcements. That is why they are attacking all coastal maritime facilities. Second, they are degrading the roads in Lebanon. That will keep reinforcements from reaching Hezbollah fighters engaged in the south. As important, it will prevent the withdrawal and redeployment of heavy equipment deployed by Hezbollah in the south, particularly their rockets, missiles and launchers. The Israelis are preparing the battlefield to prevent a Hezbollah retreat or maneuver.
Hezbollah's strategy has been imposed on it. It seems committed to standing and fighting. The rate of fire they are maintaining into Israel is clearly based on an expectation that Israel will be attacking. The rocketry guarantees the Israelis will attack. Hezbollah has been reported to have anti-tank and anti-air weapons. The Israelis will use airmobile tactics to surround and isolate Hezbollah concentrations, but in the end, they will have to go in, engage and defeat Hezbollah tactically. Hezbollah obviously knows this, but there is no sign of disintegration on its part. At the very least, Hezbollah is projecting an appetite for combat. Sources in Beirut, who have been reliable to this point, say Hezbollah has weapons that have not yet been seen, such as anti-aircraft missiles, and that these will be used shortly. Whatever the truth of this, Hezbollah does not seem to think its situation is hopeless.
The uncertain question is Syria. No matter how effectively Israel seals the Lebanese coast, so long as the Syrian frontier is open, Hezbollah might get supplies from there, and might be able to retreat there. So far, there has been only one reported airstrike on a Syrian target. Both Israel and Syria were quick to deny this.
What is interesting is that it was the Syrians who insisted very publicly that no such attack took place. The Syrians are clearly trying to avoid a situation in which they are locked into a confrontation with Israel. Israel might well think this is the time to have it out with Syria as well, but Syria is trying very hard not to give Israel casus belli. In addition, Syria is facilitating the movement of Westerners out of Lebanon, allowing them free transit. They are trying to signal that they are being cooperative and nonaggressive.
The problem is this: While Syria does not want to get hit and will not make overt moves, so long as the Syrians cannot guarantee supplies will not reach Hezbollah or that Hezbollah won't be given sanctuary in Syria, Israel cannot complete its mission of shattering Hezbollah and withdrawing. They could be drawn into an Iraq-like situation that they absolutely don't want. Israel is torn. On the one hand, it wants to crush Hezbollah, and that requires total isolation. On the other hand, it does not want the Syrian regime to fall. What comes after would be much worse from Israel's point of view.
This is the inherent problem built into Israel's strategy, and what gives Hezbollah some hope. If Israel does not attack Syria, Hezbollah could well survive Israel's attack by moving across the border. No matter how many roads are destroyed, Israel won't be able to prevent major Hezbollah formations moving across the border. If they do attack Syria and crush al Assad's government, Hezbollah could come out of this stronger than ever.
Judging from the airstrikes in the past 24 hours, it would appear Israel is trying to solve the problem tactically, by degrading Lebanese transport facilities. That could increase the effectiveness of the strategy, but in the end cannot be sufficient. We continue to think Israel will choose not to attack Syria directly and therefore, while the invasion will buy time, it will not solve the problem. Hezbollah certainly expects to be badly hurt, but it does not seem to expect to be completely annihilated. We are guessing, but our guess is that they are reading Israel's views on Syria and are betting that, in the long run, they will come out stronger. Of course, Israel knows this and therefore may have a different plan for Syria. At any rate, this is the great unknown in this campaign.
The other unknown is the withdrawal of Western nationals from Lebanon. We have received very reliable reports from sources in Lebanon who assure us Hezbollah does not intend to renew hostage taking, which is deemed an old and nonproductive strategy. These same sources have reported splits in Hezbollah over how aggressive it should be. We believe Hezbollah has no current plans for hostage taking. We are not convinced, however, that in the course of the battle it will not change its mind, or that with weakened central control elements, elements of Hezbollah will take hostages as a bargaining chip. Regardless of what Hezbollah is saying now, hostage taking must be taken seriously as a possibility.
The U.S. Embassy in Beirut is now saying plans are being developed in concert with the U.S. Defense Department for extracting U.S. nationals from Lebanon. A convoy scheduled to travel from the American University of Beirut to Amman, Jordan, via Syria, was cancelled at the last moment, with participants being told that the embassy has other plans.
There are said to be 25,000 U.S. citizens in Lebanon, but many of these are Lebanese-American dual nationals who actually live in Lebanon as Lebanese. These are less visible, less at risk and have greater resources for survival. The most at-risk Americans are those who hold only U.S. papers and are clearly American, such as employees of American companies, students studying at Lebanese universities and tourists. There is no clear count of these high-risk nationals, nor is there a count on high-risk nationals from other non-Islamic countries. There are thousands, however, and getting them out will be difficult.
The U.S. Embassy is considering flying them to Cyprus. That would mean an air bridge from Beirut International Airport, where a single runway has been opened, to Cyprus, a short flight away. The United States will not do this while Beirut is under attack, so it will ask the Israelis to create a safe zone and air corridor during the evacuation. But the threat on the ground is real, and we suspect the United States will send troops in to secure the perimeter and surrounding areas against shoulder-launched missiles. They will also keep the precise timing secret, although thousands of people in Lebanon -- the evacuees -- will know it is coming.
There was a Marine Expeditionary Force on maneuvers in the Red Sea a few days ago. We do not know where they are now, but they had 2,200 marines on board -- the right number to secure extraction. We suspect aircraft will be chartered from airlines in the region and that some U.S. Air Force and allied aircraft might also be used. Doubtless, the United States is busy organizing it. Given that the United States cancelled several ad hoc withdrawals, it must be highly confident it has the process nailed; we would expect this operation to get going sometime Sunday. Assuming aircraft that can carry any average of 200 people (purely arbitrary), 50-100 flights could get everyone out. Assuming that everyone can be notified and can get to Beirut International Airport. That won't happen. The remainder who are at risk will probably be advised to move into Christian areas east and northeast of Beirut and to keep their heads down for the duration. It is also possible that discussion of Cyprus notwithstanding, the path will be through Syria, but we doubt that.
In the meantime, that Israel has not sent major ground units into Lebanon yet (lots of small units are operating there) but is taking rocket attacks and hunkering down indicates it does not plan to act piecemeal. If we were to guess, the main thrust would likely begin late Sunday night or Monday morning. They will be ready by then. Of course we are not privy to Israeli operations, so it could be delayed 24-48 hours to give forces a chance to gear up. But given the Hezbollah bombardment, the Israelis are under pressure to move sooner rather than later.
We are in a relatively quiet spell (emphasis on quiet). Both sides have made their strategic decisions. Both know how the war will be fought. Hezbollah thinks it can give as good as it will get for a while, and will ultimately be able to regroup for a guerrilla war against the Israelis. Israel thinks it can immobilize and crush Hezbollah quickly and decisively and will be able to withdraw. Both sides know Syria is the wild card, and neither is quite sure how it will play its hand. One side is wrong in its expectations about the outcome. That's the nature of war.
Hezbollah's Motives - from Stratfor
Jul. 14th, 2006 06:02 pmHezbollah's decision to increase operations against Israel was not taken lightly. The leadership of Hezbollah has not so much moderated over the years as it has aged. The group's leaders have also, with age, become comfortable and in many cases wealthy. They are at least part of the Lebanese political process, and in some real sense part of the Lebanese establishment. These are men with a radical past and of radical mind-set, but they are older, comfortable and less adventurous than 20 years ago. Therefore, the question is: Why are they increasing tensions with Israel and inviting an invasion that threatens their very lives? There are three things to look at: the situation among the Palestinians, the situation in Lebanon and the situation in the Islamic world. But first we must consider the situation in Hezbollah itself.
There is a generation gap in Hezbollah. Hezbollah began as a Shiite radical group inspired by the Iranian Islamic Revolution. In that context, Hezbollah represented a militant, nonsecular alternative to the Nasserite Fatah, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other groups that took their bearing from Pan-Arabism rather than Islam. Hezbollah split the Shiite community in Lebanon -- which was against Sunnis and Christians -- but most of all, engaged the Israelis. It made a powerful claim that the Palestinian movement had no future while it remained fundamentally secular and while its religious alternatives derived from the conservative Arab monarchies. More than anyone, it was Hezbollah that introduced Islamist suicide bombings.
Hezbollah had a split personality, however; it was supported by two very different states. Iran was radically Islamist. Syria, much closer and a major power in Lebanon, was secular and socialist. They shared an anti-Zionist ideology, but beyond that, not much. Moreover, the Syrians viewed the Palestinian claim for a state with a jaundiced eye. Palestine was, from their point of view, part of the Ottoman Empire's Syrian province, divided by the British and French. Syria wanted to destroy Israel, but not necessarily to create a Palestinian state.
From Syria's point of view, the real issue was the future of Lebanon, which it wanted to reabsorb into Syria, or at the very least economically exploit. The Syrians intervened in Lebanon against the Palestine Liberation Organization and on the side of some Christian elements. Their goal was much less ideological than political and economic. They saw Hezbollah as a tool in their fight with Yasser Arafat and for domination of Syria.
Hezbollah strategically was aligned with Iran. Tactically, it had to align itself with Syria, since the Syrians dominated Lebanon. That meant that when Syria wanted tension with Israel, Hezbollah provided it, and when Syria wanted things to quiet down, Hezbollah cooled it. Meanwhile the leadership of Hezbollah, aligned with the Syrians, was in a position to prosper, particular after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.
That withdrawal involved a basic, quiet agreement between Syria and Israel. Israel accepted Syrian domination of Lebanon. In return, Syria was expected to maintain a security regime that controlled Hezbollah. Attacks against Israel had to be kept within certain acceptable limits. Syria, having far less interest in Israel than in Lebanon, saw this as an opportunity to achieve its ends. Israel saw Syrian domination under these terms as a stabilizing force.
Destabilization
Two things converged to destabilize this situation. The emergence of Hamas as a major force among the Palestinians meant the Palestinian polity was being redefined. Even before the elections catapulted Hamas into a leadership role, it was clear that the Fatah-dominated government of Arafat was collapsing. Everything was up for grabs. That meant that either Hezbollah made a move or would be permanently a Lebanese organization. It had to show it was willing to take risks and be effective. In fact, it had to show that it was the most effective of all the groups. The leadership might have been reluctant, but the younger members saw this as their moment, and frankly, the old juices might have been running in the older leadership. They moved.
The second part of this occurred in Lebanon itself. After the death of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, outside pressure, primarily from the United States, forced a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Now, do not overestimate the extent of the withdrawal. Syrian influence in Lebanon is still enormous. But it did relieve Syria of the burden of controlling Hezbollah. Indeed, Israel was not overly enthusiastic about Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon for just that reason.
Syria could now claim to have no influence or obligation concerning Hezbollah. Hezbollah's leadership lost the cover of being able to tell the young Turks that they would be more aggressive, but that the Syrians would not let them. As the Syrian withdrawal loosened up Lebanese politics, Hezbollah was neither restrained nor could it pretend to be restrained. Whatever the mixed feelings might have been, the mission was the mission, Syrian withdrawal opened the door and Hezbollah could not resist walking through it, and many members urgently wanted to walk through it.
At the same time the Iranians were deeply involved in negotiations in Iraq and over Tehran's nuclear program. They wanted as many levers as they could find to use in negotiations against the United States. They already had the ability to destabilize Iraq. They had a nuclear program the United States wanted to get rid of. Reactivating a global network that directly threatened American interests was another chip on the bargaining table. Not attacking U.S. interests but attacking Israel demonstrated Hezbollah's vibrancy without directly threatening the United States. Moreover, activities around the world, not carefully shielded in some cases, gave Iran further leverage.
In addition, it allowed Iran to reclaim its place as the leader of Islamic radical resurgence. Al Qaeda, a Sunni group, had supplanted Iran in the Islamic world. Indeed, Iran's collaboration with the West allowed Tehran to be pictured among the "hypocrites" Osama bin Laden condemned. Iran wants to become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf, and one part of that is to take away the mantle of Islamic radicalism from al Qaeda. Since al Qaeda is a damaged organization at best, and since Hezbollah pioneered Islamist terrorism on a global basis, reactivating Hezbollah made a great deal of sense to the Iranians.
Hezbollah's Position
Syria benefited by showing how badly it was needed in Lebanon. Iran picked up additional leverage against the United States. Hezbollah claimed a major place at the negotiations shaping the future of Palestinian politics. It all made a great deal of sense.
Of course, it was also obvious that Israel would respond. From Syria's point of view, that was fine. Israel would bog down again. It would turn to Syria to relieve it of its burdens. Israel would not want an Islamic regime in Damascus. Syria gets regime preservation and the opportunity to reclaim Lebanon. Iran gets a war hundreds of miles away from it, letting others fight its battles. It can claim it is the real enemy of Israel in the Islamic world. The United States might bargain away interests in Iraq in order to control Hezbollah. An Israeli invasion opens up possibilities without creating much risk.
It is Hezbollah that takes it on the chin. But Hezbollah, by its nature and its relationships, really did not have much choice. It had to act or become irrelevant. So now the question is: What does Hezbollah do when the Israelis come? They can resist. They have anti-tank weapons and other systems from Iran. They can inflict casualties. They can impose a counterinsurgency. Syria may think Israel will have to stay, but Israel plans to crush Hezbollah's infrastructure and leave, forcing Hezbollah to take years to recover. Everyone else in Lebanon is furious at Hezbollah for disrupting the recovery. What does Hezbollah do?
In the 1980s, what Hezbollah did was take Western hostages. The United States is enormously sensitive to hostage situations. It led Ronald Reagan to Iran-Contra. Politically, the United States has trouble handling hostages. This is the one thing Hezbollah learned in the 1980s that the leaders remember. A portfolio of hostages is life insurance. Hezbollah could go back to its old habits. It makes sense to do so.
It will not do this while there is a chance of averting an invasion. But once it is crystal clear it is coming, grabbing hostages makes sense. Assuming the invasion is going to occur early next week -- or a political settlement is going to take place -- Western powers now have no more than 72 hours to get their nationals out of Beirut or into places of safety. That probably cannot be done. There are thousands of Westerners in Beirut. But the next few days will focus on ascertaining Israeli intensions and timelines, and executing plans to withdraw citizens. The Israelis might well shift their timeline to facilitate this. But all things considered, if Hezbollah returns to its roots, it should return to its first operational model: hostages.
There is a generation gap in Hezbollah. Hezbollah began as a Shiite radical group inspired by the Iranian Islamic Revolution. In that context, Hezbollah represented a militant, nonsecular alternative to the Nasserite Fatah, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other groups that took their bearing from Pan-Arabism rather than Islam. Hezbollah split the Shiite community in Lebanon -- which was against Sunnis and Christians -- but most of all, engaged the Israelis. It made a powerful claim that the Palestinian movement had no future while it remained fundamentally secular and while its religious alternatives derived from the conservative Arab monarchies. More than anyone, it was Hezbollah that introduced Islamist suicide bombings.
Hezbollah had a split personality, however; it was supported by two very different states. Iran was radically Islamist. Syria, much closer and a major power in Lebanon, was secular and socialist. They shared an anti-Zionist ideology, but beyond that, not much. Moreover, the Syrians viewed the Palestinian claim for a state with a jaundiced eye. Palestine was, from their point of view, part of the Ottoman Empire's Syrian province, divided by the British and French. Syria wanted to destroy Israel, but not necessarily to create a Palestinian state.
From Syria's point of view, the real issue was the future of Lebanon, which it wanted to reabsorb into Syria, or at the very least economically exploit. The Syrians intervened in Lebanon against the Palestine Liberation Organization and on the side of some Christian elements. Their goal was much less ideological than political and economic. They saw Hezbollah as a tool in their fight with Yasser Arafat and for domination of Syria.
Hezbollah strategically was aligned with Iran. Tactically, it had to align itself with Syria, since the Syrians dominated Lebanon. That meant that when Syria wanted tension with Israel, Hezbollah provided it, and when Syria wanted things to quiet down, Hezbollah cooled it. Meanwhile the leadership of Hezbollah, aligned with the Syrians, was in a position to prosper, particular after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.
That withdrawal involved a basic, quiet agreement between Syria and Israel. Israel accepted Syrian domination of Lebanon. In return, Syria was expected to maintain a security regime that controlled Hezbollah. Attacks against Israel had to be kept within certain acceptable limits. Syria, having far less interest in Israel than in Lebanon, saw this as an opportunity to achieve its ends. Israel saw Syrian domination under these terms as a stabilizing force.
Destabilization
Two things converged to destabilize this situation. The emergence of Hamas as a major force among the Palestinians meant the Palestinian polity was being redefined. Even before the elections catapulted Hamas into a leadership role, it was clear that the Fatah-dominated government of Arafat was collapsing. Everything was up for grabs. That meant that either Hezbollah made a move or would be permanently a Lebanese organization. It had to show it was willing to take risks and be effective. In fact, it had to show that it was the most effective of all the groups. The leadership might have been reluctant, but the younger members saw this as their moment, and frankly, the old juices might have been running in the older leadership. They moved.
The second part of this occurred in Lebanon itself. After the death of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, outside pressure, primarily from the United States, forced a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Now, do not overestimate the extent of the withdrawal. Syrian influence in Lebanon is still enormous. But it did relieve Syria of the burden of controlling Hezbollah. Indeed, Israel was not overly enthusiastic about Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon for just that reason.
Syria could now claim to have no influence or obligation concerning Hezbollah. Hezbollah's leadership lost the cover of being able to tell the young Turks that they would be more aggressive, but that the Syrians would not let them. As the Syrian withdrawal loosened up Lebanese politics, Hezbollah was neither restrained nor could it pretend to be restrained. Whatever the mixed feelings might have been, the mission was the mission, Syrian withdrawal opened the door and Hezbollah could not resist walking through it, and many members urgently wanted to walk through it.
At the same time the Iranians were deeply involved in negotiations in Iraq and over Tehran's nuclear program. They wanted as many levers as they could find to use in negotiations against the United States. They already had the ability to destabilize Iraq. They had a nuclear program the United States wanted to get rid of. Reactivating a global network that directly threatened American interests was another chip on the bargaining table. Not attacking U.S. interests but attacking Israel demonstrated Hezbollah's vibrancy without directly threatening the United States. Moreover, activities around the world, not carefully shielded in some cases, gave Iran further leverage.
In addition, it allowed Iran to reclaim its place as the leader of Islamic radical resurgence. Al Qaeda, a Sunni group, had supplanted Iran in the Islamic world. Indeed, Iran's collaboration with the West allowed Tehran to be pictured among the "hypocrites" Osama bin Laden condemned. Iran wants to become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf, and one part of that is to take away the mantle of Islamic radicalism from al Qaeda. Since al Qaeda is a damaged organization at best, and since Hezbollah pioneered Islamist terrorism on a global basis, reactivating Hezbollah made a great deal of sense to the Iranians.
Hezbollah's Position
Syria benefited by showing how badly it was needed in Lebanon. Iran picked up additional leverage against the United States. Hezbollah claimed a major place at the negotiations shaping the future of Palestinian politics. It all made a great deal of sense.
Of course, it was also obvious that Israel would respond. From Syria's point of view, that was fine. Israel would bog down again. It would turn to Syria to relieve it of its burdens. Israel would not want an Islamic regime in Damascus. Syria gets regime preservation and the opportunity to reclaim Lebanon. Iran gets a war hundreds of miles away from it, letting others fight its battles. It can claim it is the real enemy of Israel in the Islamic world. The United States might bargain away interests in Iraq in order to control Hezbollah. An Israeli invasion opens up possibilities without creating much risk.
It is Hezbollah that takes it on the chin. But Hezbollah, by its nature and its relationships, really did not have much choice. It had to act or become irrelevant. So now the question is: What does Hezbollah do when the Israelis come? They can resist. They have anti-tank weapons and other systems from Iran. They can inflict casualties. They can impose a counterinsurgency. Syria may think Israel will have to stay, but Israel plans to crush Hezbollah's infrastructure and leave, forcing Hezbollah to take years to recover. Everyone else in Lebanon is furious at Hezbollah for disrupting the recovery. What does Hezbollah do?
In the 1980s, what Hezbollah did was take Western hostages. The United States is enormously sensitive to hostage situations. It led Ronald Reagan to Iran-Contra. Politically, the United States has trouble handling hostages. This is the one thing Hezbollah learned in the 1980s that the leaders remember. A portfolio of hostages is life insurance. Hezbollah could go back to its old habits. It makes sense to do so.
It will not do this while there is a chance of averting an invasion. But once it is crystal clear it is coming, grabbing hostages makes sense. Assuming the invasion is going to occur early next week -- or a political settlement is going to take place -- Western powers now have no more than 72 hours to get their nationals out of Beirut or into places of safety. That probably cannot be done. There are thousands of Westerners in Beirut. But the next few days will focus on ascertaining Israeli intensions and timelines, and executing plans to withdraw citizens. The Israelis might well shift their timeline to facilitate this. But all things considered, if Hezbollah returns to its roots, it should return to its first operational model: hostages.
Middle East Education
Jul. 14th, 2006 04:26 pmI'm seeing a whole lot of bullshit and misunderstanding around this whole Lebanon thing so I thought I'd provide some illumination. I'm going to avoid arguing one side or the other and address some basic realities in terms of whats going on in as neutral language as I can muster.
I've heard people say that "Israel shouldn't attack Lebanon proper for the acts of a terrorist group", or "instead of bombing, Israel should work with the Lebanese government to capture the terrorists and free their soldiers." If this was a problem between the US and Canada, both of those points would be exceedingly valid.
Unfortunatly this isn't.
The Hezbollah are not a terrorist group in the way you might think. They control roughly 40% of Lebanese territory. They hold seats in Parliament and have a position in the Executive cabinet. It is more than likely that they have more military strength than the Prime Minister of Lebanon.
What this means is that the Lebanese government is incapable of and unwilling to work with Israel to deal with the problem because the people who are committing these acts of violence are powerful members of the government.
The essential problem both the Palestinians and Lebanon have is that their administrations are unable to secure a monopoly of force. A monopoly of force is quite frankly the essential building block for statehood. Sure we have militant nutjobs in the US but the FBI can and has stomped on them whenever they step out of line.
I completely understand that in all likelihood neither Abbas (president of the PA) or Siniora (prime minister of Lebanon) are capable at this time of preventing all attacks on Israel by militants operating in their territory. However they are obliged to make the effort, something they have not done at the most basic of levels.
The government of a nation, any nation, is held responsible for the militant activities of its citizens, whether those activities are sanctioned by that government or not. Just as the people of a nation, any nation, are held responsible for the actions of its government, whether they agree with those actions or not.
I've heard people say that "Israel shouldn't attack Lebanon proper for the acts of a terrorist group", or "instead of bombing, Israel should work with the Lebanese government to capture the terrorists and free their soldiers." If this was a problem between the US and Canada, both of those points would be exceedingly valid.
Unfortunatly this isn't.
The Hezbollah are not a terrorist group in the way you might think. They control roughly 40% of Lebanese territory. They hold seats in Parliament and have a position in the Executive cabinet. It is more than likely that they have more military strength than the Prime Minister of Lebanon.
What this means is that the Lebanese government is incapable of and unwilling to work with Israel to deal with the problem because the people who are committing these acts of violence are powerful members of the government.
The essential problem both the Palestinians and Lebanon have is that their administrations are unable to secure a monopoly of force. A monopoly of force is quite frankly the essential building block for statehood. Sure we have militant nutjobs in the US but the FBI can and has stomped on them whenever they step out of line.
I completely understand that in all likelihood neither Abbas (president of the PA) or Siniora (prime minister of Lebanon) are capable at this time of preventing all attacks on Israel by militants operating in their territory. However they are obliged to make the effort, something they have not done at the most basic of levels.
The government of a nation, any nation, is held responsible for the militant activities of its citizens, whether those activities are sanctioned by that government or not. Just as the people of a nation, any nation, are held responsible for the actions of its government, whether they agree with those actions or not.
the long ass meme
Jul. 8th, 2006 03:34 pm(fyi, I'm having problems with my ftp site so my trip photos are delayed, and since I'm frustrated with working on it, I'm going out on a boat with some friends and getting drunk)
(Click here to post your own answers for this meme.)
( it goes on... )
(Click here to post your own answers for this meme.)
| ✓ I miss somebody right now. | ✓ I don't watch much TV these days. (Any) | ✓ I own lots of books. (Yup) |
| ✓ I wear glasses or contact lenses. | × I love to play video games. (eh, rarely do I find one which interests me) | ✓ I've tried marijuana. (I inhaled even) |
| ✓ I've watched porn movies. (well duh) | × I have been the psycho-ex in a past relationship. | × I believe honesty is usually the best policy. |
| ✓ I curse sometimes. | × I have changed a lot mentally over the last year. (not really sure on this one, in some ways perhaps, although I'm not sure how much regression counts) | × I carry my knife/razor everywhere with me. (but mom - all the cool kids are cutting too) |
A very attractive blonde woman arrived at a casino and bet twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) on a single roll of the dice. She said, "I hope y'all don't mind, but I feel much luckier when I'm completely nude."
With that, she stripped from the neck down, rolled the dice and yelled: "Come on, baby, Mama needs new clothes!"
As the dice came to a stop she jumped up and down and squealed: "YES! YES! I WON, I WON!"
She hugged each of the dealers and then picked up her winnings and her clothes and quickly departed. The dealers stared at each other dumbfounded.
Finally, one of them asked, "What did she roll?"
The other answered, "I don't know, I, I thought you were watching."
Moral - Not all blondes are dumb, but all men are men.
With that, she stripped from the neck down, rolled the dice and yelled: "Come on, baby, Mama needs new clothes!"
As the dice came to a stop she jumped up and down and squealed: "YES! YES! I WON, I WON!"
She hugged each of the dealers and then picked up her winnings and her clothes and quickly departed. The dealers stared at each other dumbfounded.
Finally, one of them asked, "What did she roll?"
The other answered, "I don't know, I, I thought you were watching."
Moral - Not all blondes are dumb, but all men are men.
shits and giggles
Jun. 28th, 2006 12:27 amI died in the Dungeon of Plural
I was killed in a cold tunnel by Luv2ride the cockatrice, whilst carrying...
the Crown of Xelyn23, the Armour of Consume, the Crown of Darwinpolice, a Figurine of Redfruit, the Sceptre of Keyl, the Armour of Ice, the Shield of Thawaltzingfool, the Amulet of Conversation, the Wand of Sonicblue, the Axe of Witsbeginning, the Shield of Coolstring, a Figurine of Lima Pcp, the Wand of Heroin Noir, a Figurine of Sublate, the Shield of Blazing Souls, a Figurine of Interdictor, a Figurine of Nelliebelle, the Sword of Starcowboy, the Shield of Moderndayknight, a Figurine of In Vivo, the Sceptre of Aldous Huxley, the Amulet of Xelyn, a Figurine of Doc Neuro, the Sceptre of Louis Sapphire and 549 gold pieces.
Score: 587
Explore the Dungeon of Plural and try to beat this score,or enter your username to generate and explore your own dungeon...
Wiki Birthday Meme
Apr. 9th, 2006 04:00 amYeah so
I'm not so good at following directions
anyway the goods on me birthday:
Events
1540 - The Society of Jesus (the Jesuits) receives its charter from Pope Paul III.
1590 - Pope Urban VII dies 13 days after being chosen as the Pope, making his reign the shortest papacy in history.
1787 - The United States Constitution is delivered to the states for ratification.
1821 - Mexico gains its independence from Spain.
1822 - Jean-François Champollion announces that he has deciphered the Rosetta stone.
1940 - The Tripartite Pact is signed in Berlin by Germany, Japan and Italy.
1983 - Richard Stallman announces the GNU project to develop a free Unix-like operating system.
1998 - Google is first established
Births
1601 - King Louis XIII of France (d. 1643)
1722 - Samuel Adams, American revolutionary leader (d. 1803)
1947 - Meat Loaf, American singer and actor
1965 - Peter MacKay, Canadian political leader
1975 - Plural, The Alpha & the Omega
1984 - Avril Lavigne, Canadian singer and songwriter
Deaths
1249 - Count Raymond VII of Toulouse (b. 1197)
1557 - Emperor Go-Nara of Japan (b. 1497)
1590 - Pope Urban VII (b. 1521)
1651 - Maximilian I, Elector of Bavaria (b. 1573)
1660 - Vincent de Paul, French saint (b. 1580)
1700 - Pope Innocent XII (b. 1615)
1917 - Edgar Degas, French painter (b. 1834)
1967 - Prince Felix Yussupov, Russian assassin of Rasputin (b. 1887)
I'm not so good at following directions
anyway the goods on me birthday:
Events
1540 - The Society of Jesus (the Jesuits) receives its charter from Pope Paul III.
1590 - Pope Urban VII dies 13 days after being chosen as the Pope, making his reign the shortest papacy in history.
1787 - The United States Constitution is delivered to the states for ratification.
1821 - Mexico gains its independence from Spain.
1822 - Jean-François Champollion announces that he has deciphered the Rosetta stone.
1940 - The Tripartite Pact is signed in Berlin by Germany, Japan and Italy.
1983 - Richard Stallman announces the GNU project to develop a free Unix-like operating system.
1998 - Google is first established
Births
1601 - King Louis XIII of France (d. 1643)
1722 - Samuel Adams, American revolutionary leader (d. 1803)
1947 - Meat Loaf, American singer and actor
1965 - Peter MacKay, Canadian political leader
1975 - Plural, The Alpha & the Omega
1984 - Avril Lavigne, Canadian singer and songwriter
Deaths
1249 - Count Raymond VII of Toulouse (b. 1197)
1557 - Emperor Go-Nara of Japan (b. 1497)
1590 - Pope Urban VII (b. 1521)
1651 - Maximilian I, Elector of Bavaria (b. 1573)
1660 - Vincent de Paul, French saint (b. 1580)
1700 - Pope Innocent XII (b. 1615)
1917 - Edgar Degas, French painter (b. 1834)
1967 - Prince Felix Yussupov, Russian assassin of Rasputin (b. 1887)
after posting that last entry
I realized I'd completely forgotten
to post the complete version of my play
I've been to busy working my ass off on my plan
and masturbating to pictures of that yacht
I cant do it now as I have to go do some recon
but I promise I'll do it before I go to bed tonight
love love
your plural
I realized I'd completely forgotten
to post the complete version of my play
I've been to busy working my ass off on my plan
and masturbating to pictures of that yacht
I cant do it now as I have to go do some recon
but I promise I'll do it before I go to bed tonight
love love
your plural
A big swinging dick
Mar. 12th, 2006 03:47 pmI've been working on a little project
its sexy, its powerful
and
it might just help me afford
This
[warning boat porn - not work safe if you like boats]
[if you are indifferent to boats, its perfectly work safe however]
I'm not been one to be crude
but
my metaphorical cock
is about four feet long right now
I'm going to go out to a nice open field
and swing it around
its sexy, its powerful
and
it might just help me afford
This
[warning boat porn - not work safe if you like boats]
[if you are indifferent to boats, its perfectly work safe however]
I'm not been one to be crude
but
my metaphorical cock
is about four feet long right now
I'm going to go out to a nice open field
and swing it around
Resignation from Adulthood.
Feb. 27th, 2006 04:23 amI am hereby officially tendering my resignation as an adult.
I have decided I would like to accept the responsibilities of an 8 year old again.
I want to sail sticks across a fresh mud puddle and make a sidewalk with rocks.
I want to think M&M's are better than money because you can eat them.
I want to lie under a big oak tree and run a lemonade stand with my friends on a hot summers day.
I want to return to a time when life was simple, when all I knew was colors, multiplication tables, and nursery rhymes, but that didnt bother me because I didnt know what I didnt know and I didnt care. All I knew was to be happy because I was blissfully unaware of all the things that should make me worried or upset.
I want to think the world is fair.
I want to think that everyone is honest and good.
I want to believe anything is possible.
I want to be oblivious to the complexities of life and be overly excited by the little things again.
I want to live simple again.
I dont want my day to consist of computer crashes, mountains of paper work, depressing news, how to survive more days than there is money in the bank, doctor bills, gossip, illness, and loss of loved ones.
I want to believe in the power of smiles, hugs, a kind word, truth, justice, peace, dreams, imagination, mankind, and making angels in the snow.
So......heres my checkbook and my car keys, my credit card bills and my 401K statements.
I am officially resigning from adulthood.
And if you want to discuss this further you'll have to catch me first cause.......
"TAG! YOU'RE IT!"
[a email I received from my father]
I have decided I would like to accept the responsibilities of an 8 year old again.
So......heres my checkbook and my car keys, my credit card bills and my 401K statements.
I am officially resigning from adulthood.
And if you want to discuss this further you'll have to catch me first cause.......
"TAG! YOU'RE IT!"
[a email I received from my father]
Happy Fucking Joy Joy
Feb. 21st, 2006 05:52 pmhaving to evacuate my house for the night
we've had a nasty cold front the last couple of days
and I got a couple of burst pipes
spent the day becoming very intimate with my mop
the plumber says they should be able to
have it fixed and the heat back on by tomorrow
or thursday at the latest
I'd spend the night here
but seeing as all the water has been turned off
it isnt really a good option
I kinda need drinking water
and a place to vacate my wastes
sure
I could pull a buffster and go all survival nut
and do just fine
but
unlike buff
I'd rather find myself a nice lovely
[or two or three]
rent a cozy hotel room
and devote the night to bacchus instead
I'll be out of communication
for at least a day
so
take care
love love
your plural
we've had a nasty cold front the last couple of days
and I got a couple of burst pipes
spent the day becoming very intimate with my mop
the plumber says they should be able to
have it fixed and the heat back on by tomorrow
or thursday at the latest
I'd spend the night here
but seeing as all the water has been turned off
it isnt really a good option
I kinda need drinking water
and a place to vacate my wastes
sure
I could pull a buffster and go all survival nut
and do just fine
but
unlike buff
I'd rather find myself a nice lovely
[or two or three]
rent a cozy hotel room
and devote the night to bacchus instead
I'll be out of communication
for at least a day
so
take care
love love
your plural
This is a Test
Were it an actual emergency
I'd be in tahiti with the swedish bikini team
anyway
My dear friend![[livejournal.com profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/external/lj-userinfo.gif)
budhaboy first posted about this here
Basically google is returning an error message to him
[and apparently others]
saying "cannot view in your country." when they try to view the video.
I'm using a Canadian ISP and can view the video
so I cant test it.
So I need my American readers to test the link
and see if they can access the video
and report back
Please include the name of your ISP
and your physical location in a comment
and whether or not you are able to view the video
additionally if you get a different error message
please include that as well
The video is found at the following link:
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=4258374615945369026
Were it an actual emergency
I'd be in tahiti with the swedish bikini team
anyway
My dear friend
budhaboy first posted about this hereBasically google is returning an error message to him
[and apparently others]
saying "cannot view in your country." when they try to view the video.
I'm using a Canadian ISP and can view the video
so I cant test it.
So I need my American readers to test the link
and see if they can access the video
and report back
Please include the name of your ISP
and your physical location in a comment
and whether or not you are able to view the video
additionally if you get a different error message
please include that as well
The video is found at the following link:
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=4258374615945369026
(no subject)
Feb. 3rd, 2006 01:30 amHad dinner with the local MP and his wife tonight
[member of parliament, sort of a candian congressman]
was mildly amusing
drank a lot of scotch
went to hear a talk on economics
drank a lot more scotch
I'm going to be slammed this weekend
but what I really want to do is
work on the second half of the play
[I'm kinda excited bout it]
and now
I'm going to bed
[member of parliament, sort of a candian congressman]
was mildly amusing
drank a lot of scotch
went to hear a talk on economics
drank a lot more scotch
I'm going to be slammed this weekend
but what I really want to do is
work on the second half of the play
[I'm kinda excited bout it]
and now
I'm going to bed
I'm all for multiculturalism, but jesus fucking christ.
I thought we got past the whole "she was asking for it" shit.
a professor of social anthropology at the University of Oslo (who was described as having "lived for many years in Muslim countries") as saying that "Norwegian women must take their share of responsibility for these rapes" because Muslim men found their manner of dress provocative. One reason for the high number of rapes by Muslims, explained the professor, was that in their native countries "rape is scarcely punished," since Muslims "believe that it is women who are responsible for rape." The professor's conclusion was not that Muslim men living in the West needed to adjust to Western norms, but the exact opposite: "Norwegian women must realize that we live in a multicultural society and adapt themselves to it."
I thought we got past the whole "she was asking for it" shit.
a professor of social anthropology at the University of Oslo (who was described as having "lived for many years in Muslim countries") as saying that "Norwegian women must take their share of responsibility for these rapes" because Muslim men found their manner of dress provocative. One reason for the high number of rapes by Muslims, explained the professor, was that in their native countries "rape is scarcely punished," since Muslims "believe that it is women who are responsible for rape." The professor's conclusion was not that Muslim men living in the West needed to adjust to Western norms, but the exact opposite: "Norwegian women must realize that we live in a multicultural society and adapt themselves to it."
Act 1, Scene 2
Feb. 1st, 2006 12:14 pmOk, I've finished the second scene
again this is just a rough draft
As my dearfoltere pointed out
I need to work on Jack and Daphne's dialogue
but I'm going to wait till I've gotten the entire thing written to do so.
so give me your best shots
cause every criticism means a better finished product.
and
If you havent read Act 1, Scene 1:
Go read it here first
( Act 1, Scene 2 )
again this is just a rough draft
As my dear
foltere pointed outI need to work on Jack and Daphne's dialogue
but I'm going to wait till I've gotten the entire thing written to do so.
so give me your best shots
cause every criticism means a better finished product.
and
If you havent read Act 1, Scene 1:
Go read it here first
( Act 1, Scene 2 )
