plural

I've spent the last four hours reading various news reports, blogs and whatnot talking about the current crisis in the Middle East, and have decided to share a number of them. I'll add the advance caveat, that while I consider each of these to have some important implications, I'm providing these primarily as food for thought as opposed to certifiable fact.

I happen to believe that further inquiry is necessary into many of the events discussed below before we can truly understand these events in a complete and truthful manner.

without further ado:

I asked him what he would've thought, if a Hezbollah rocket had attacked a building in Israel, killing 55 civilians, of which 30 were children. He responded immediately "I would've thought it was great! Asan!".

An Egyptian blogger asks Some slightly uncomfortable questions

-

'Hizbullah has placed rocket launcher on building's roof and brought invalid children inside in bid to provoke Israeli response.'

The Lebanese web site LIBANOSCOPIE reported that Hizbullah has masterminded a plan that would result in the killing of innocents in the Qana village, in a bid to foil Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's "Seven Points Plan", which calls for deployment of the Lebanese army in southern Lebanon and the disarming of Hizbullah.

-

"In the region there is of course a country such as Iran - a great country, a great people and a great civilization which is respected and which plays a stabilizing role in the region," he told a news conference.

The French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy meets with Iranian counterpart in Beirut. from Ha'artz.com

-

While the world debates about responsibility for Lebanese civilian casualties, Hezbollah takes unequivocal pride in its responsibility for causing Israeli civilians casualties. Indeed, Hezbollah celebrates its attacks on civilians as restoring "honor". Hezbollah TV, Al Manar, continues to broadcast video clips glorifying Hezbollah attacks on Israeli cities. Scenes showing Israeli civilians being rushed to the Hospitals are accompanied by the words:

"Resist! Explode! Shake! Destroy! Your weapon restores my country's honor."

Palestinian Media Watch releases video clips shown on Hezbollah controlled Al-Manar TV

-

Islamic United Nations representatives blocked an attempt to have the world body condemn killing in the name of religion.

This is an article from 2005 which was brought to my attention: Muslim Nations Throttle U.N. terror resolutions

-

The Sbarro section of the exhibit was replete with body parts and pizza slices strewn across the room. The walls were painted red to represent spattered blood. Another part of the exhibit glorified the "martyrs" who carry out suicide operations shown with a Koran and Kalishnikov in hand.

Al Najah University celebrates the Sbarro pizza attack

-

In a survey of 5,000 Europeans in ten countries, people who believed that the Israeli soldiers "intentionally target Palestinian civilians," and that "Palestinian suicide bombers who target Israeli civilians" are justified, also believed that "Jews don’t care what happens to anyone but their own kind," "Jews have a lot of irritating faults," and "Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get what they want."

Diana Muir writes an article titled:Anti-Semetism and Anti-Zionism: The Link in which she examines anti-semetic remarks made by a number of European political elites. The quote above is from a study published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50 No. 4, August 2006, pp. 548-561 Available in PDF form from Yale University's Website

-

Kill A Jew - Go To Heaven. "It was always my wish to turn my body into deadly shrapnel against the Zionists and to knock on Heaven’s doors with the skulls of Zionists."

A Study by Palestinian Media Watch which examines two primary questions:

Why a Palestinian would believe that the Murders of Israelis and/or Jews is something that Islam values and demands;
Whether this is being taught by fringe groups in the Palestinian Authority (PA) or represents official PA ideology.

-

"One aerial bomb impacted in the vicinity of a UN Position in the area of Alma Ash Shab yesterday morning, causing damage to the parameter wall. It was reported that Hezbollah fired rockets from the vicinity of this UNIFIL position prior to the aerial bombardment. Hezbollah also fired small arms fire from the vicinity of the same position. They also fired rockets from the vicinity of two UNIFIL positions in area of Tibnin and At Tiri in the central sector. There was one more incident of firing from the Israeli side close to UNIFIL position in the area of Mays al Jabal, when 10 tank rounds impacted 100 meters from the UN position. UNIFIL strongly protested all these incidents to the Israeli and Lebanese authorities respectively.

Guess what I found? The daily status reports/press releases from UNIFIL makes for some interesting reading.

-

While Islamic nations are trying to get the UN to outlaw criticism of Islam on an international basis, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan assures Americans that the plan of leaving the UN in charge of the Internet is nothing to worry about, it is only to make the Internet more efficient. "One mistaken notion is that the United Nations wants to ‘take over,’ police or otherwise control the Internet. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The United Nations wants only to ensure the Internet’s global reach," according to Annan.

An article which discusses the influence of Islamic as well as non-democratic countries in the UN: Farewell to the United Nations?

[nearly all of whom are currently or have previously served in the US Navy]
[never figured out why, it just seems to be that they all end up there eventually]
[now I'm not entirely sure it is actually written by him]
[cause he didnt sign his name/rank at the bottom]
[and while I think it neglects a few of the complicating factors]
[with regard to the relatiosn between the government of lebanon and the HA]
[I found it interesting enough to share]

A Difficult Lesson

When I was in the Navy, I once witnessed a bar fight in downtown Olongapo
(Philippines) that still haunts my dreams. The fight was between a big
oafish Marine and a rather soft-spoken, medium sized Latino sailor from my
ship.

All evening the Marine had been trying to pick a fight with one of us and
had finally set his sights on this diminutive shipmate of mine...figuring
him for a safe target. When my friend refused to be goaded into a fight the
Marine sucker punched him from behind on the side of the head so hard that
blood instantly started to pour from this poor man's mutilated ear.

Everyone present was horrified and was prepared to absolutely murder this
Marine, but my shipmate quickly turned on him and began to single-handedly
back him towards a corner with a series of stinging jabs and upper cuts that
gave more than a hint to a youth spent boxing in a small gym in the Bronx.

Each punch opened a cut on the Marine's startled face and by the time he had
been backed completely into the corner he was blubbering for someone to stop
the fight. He invoked his split lips and chipped teeth as reasons to stop
the fight. He begged us to stop the fight because he could barely see
through the river of blood that was pouring out of his split and swollen
brows.

Nobody moved. Not one person.

The only sound in the bar was the sickening staccato sound of this sailor's
lightning fast fists making contact with new areas of the Marine's head.
The only sound I have heard since that was remotely similar was from the
first Rocky film when Sylvester Stallone was punching sides of beef in the
meat locker.

Finally the Marine's pleading turned to screams.... a high, almost womanly
shriek. And still the punches continued relentlessly.

Several people in the bar took a few tentative steps as though they wanted
to try to break it up at that point, but hands reached out from the crowd
and held them tight. I'm not ashamed to say that mine were two of the hands
that held someone back.

You see, in between each blow the sailor had begun chanting a soft cadence:
"Say [punch] you [punch] give [punch] up [punch]... say [punch] you
[punch]were [punch] wrong [punch]".

He had been repeating it to the Marine almost from the start but we only
became aware of it when the typical barroom cheers had died down and we
began to be sickened by the sight and sound of the carnage.

This Marine stood there shrieking in the corner of the bar trying futilely
to block the carefully timed punches that were cutting his head to
tatters... right down to the skull in places. But he refused to say that he
gave up... or that he was wrong.

Even in the delirium of his beating he believed in his heart that someone
would stop the fight before he had to admit defeat. I'm sure this strategy
had served him well in the past and had allowed him to continue on his
career as a barroom bully.

Finally, in a wail of agony the Marine shrieked "I give up", and we gently
backed the sailor away from him.

I'm sure you can guess why I have shared this story today.

I'm not particularly proud to have been witness to such a bloody spectacle,
and the sound of that Marine's woman-like shrieks will haunt me to my grave.
But I learned something that evening that Israel had better learn for itself
if it is to finally be rid of at least one of its tormentors:

This is one time an Arab aggressor must be allowed to be beaten so badly
that every civilized nation will stand in horror, wanting desperately to
step in and stop the carnage... but knowing that the fight will only truly
be over when one side gives up and finally admits defeat.

Just as every person who had ever rescued that bully from admitting defeat
helped create the cowardly brute I saw that evening in the bar, every
well-intentioned power that has ever stepped in and negotiated a ceasefire
for an Arab aggressor has helped create the monsters we see around us today.

President Lahoud of Lebanon, a big Hezbollah supporter and a close ally of
Syria, has been shrieking non-stop to the UN Security Council for the past
few days to get them to force Israel into a cease fire.

Clearly he has been reading his autographed copy of 'Military Success for
Arab Despots' by the late Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. Ever since Nasser
accidentally discovered the trick in '56, every subsequent Arab leader has
stuck to his tried and true formula for military success:

1.. Instigate a war.

2.. Once the war is well underway and you are in the process of having your
ass handed to you... get a few world powers to force your western opponent
into a cease fire.

3.. Whatever you do, don't surrender or submit to any terms dictated by your
enemy. That would ruin everything! All you have to do is wait it out and
eventually the world will become sickened at what is being done to your
soldiers and civilian population... and will force a truce.

4.. Once a truce has been called you can resume your intransigence (which
probably caused the conflict in the first place),
and even declare victory as your opponent leaves the field of battle.


This tactic has never failed. Not once.

In fact it worked so will for the Egyptians in 1973, that to this day they
celebrate the Yom Kippur War - a crushing defeat at the hands of Israel - as
a military victory! No kidding... it's a national holiday over there!

President Lahoud has already begun to shriek like a school girl to the UN
Security Council to "Stop the violence and arrange a cease-fire, and then
after that we'll be ready to discuss all matters."

Uh huh. Forgive me if I find that a tad hard to swallow. He allowed
Hezbollah to take over his country. He allowed the regular Lebanese army to
provide radar targeting data for the Hezbollah missile that struck the
Israeli destroyer. He has turned a blind eye while Iranian and Syrian
weapons, advisers and money have poured into his country.

And now that his country is in ruins he wants to call it a draw.

As much as it may sicken the world to stand by and watch it happen, strong
hands need to hold back the weak-hearted and let the fight continue until
one side finally admits unambiguous defeat.

At this moment there appears to be a major shift taking place in the war. Though the scope of the operation is unclear, it appears the Israelis have shifted to a new phase of the war, focusing on broader and more intense ground operations. It could be that this is the opening phase of a broader raid-in-force against Hezbollah that might go beyond southern Lebanon. We do not know this for certain, but it does warrant alerting our readers to the possibility. Various bits of evidence point in this direction.

For example, early Sunday Israeli time, an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesman was quoted as saying, "We have drawn our conclusions from battles in other areas, we have learned our lesson and are about to embark on another mission. There is no intention whatsoever to occupy this region or any other -- only to arrive, to act, and when we're done, to get out."



There are reports of new areas involved in fighting and new Israeli units being engaged. For example, Israeli forces are now fighting in the area of Qana. This is a few miles southeast of Tyre and deep into southern Lebanon. We have heard that the Qana action consists of engineers, armor and infantry, indicating a more traditional combined arms effort. The engineers would be clearing mines, bulldozing fortifications and clearing roads damaged by Israeli airstrikes. Infantry would be clearing the area of anti-tank teams and opening the way for broader armored thrusts to destroy rear infrastructure and isolate forward Hezbollah positions. There are additional reports of engagements near and to the west of the Israeli panhandle in the Dan-Dafna-Metulla region, along with heavy artillery fire in this region. This would be the jump-off point for an attack both westward along the Litani and northward into the Bekaa Valley. There were extensive reports of a major armored buildup in this area over the past 48 hours. This would also explain the decision to disengage temporarily at Bent Jbail in preparation for the new phase of operations.

Interestingly, the report about Qana that we have says the attacking force is from the Nahal Division. According to Israeli media, the Galilee Division, which normally has full responsibility for the entire Lebanese border, has been given responsibility for the western half of the border, while Nahal Division has been made responsible for the eastern half. If all of this is true and the Qana fighting is being carried out by Nahal, then the action at Qana represents a drive westward from the northern panhandle rather than a northern drive from Galilee division. This is of great importance because it indicates that the armor massed in the panhandle is moving in a broad encirclement as per traditional IDF doctrine. Nahal has been moving rapidly during daylight hours. Ground operations involving the Golani Brigade were also reported in Taibe last night. If Nahal moved west, it would have passed through Taibe. If the division were planning on a move north to the Bekaa Valley, it will need Taibe. The town is in a critical location.

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has canceled her visit to Lebanon. She is, however, going to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert on Sunday night and return to the United States on Monday. If nothing important were happening, Rice would stick to her schedule. If the United States objected to what is happening, Israel would postpone until she left or she would be on the plane right now. Therefore, a logical conclusion is that whatever is happening makes her trip to Lebanon pointless or harmful but that she wants to signal that there is no strain in relations with Israel. If there is a major attack coming, Washington has signed off on it.

We are approaching nightfall in Israel. If this is indeed a major shift operationally -- and we simply cannot be certain at this point, in spite of pieces seeming to fall into place -- then we would expend rapid movements of Israeli forces through the night, and we should get a sense by morning, Israel time, of just how deep they expect to go. At this point, having made the decision to shift to larger-scale, more traditional operations, Israel will want to proceed as rapidly as possible for operational and diplomatic reasons. If the Israelis are going, they will be going rapidly.

It should also be noted that Israel attacked key roads and bridges along the Syrian-Lebanese border. This indicates that Israel is not intending to use those roads to attack Syria (otherwise they would have wanted them intact) but does want to protect its flank from any Syrian countermove. It is the least intrusive action Israel can take. They neither want to attack nor be attacked by Syria.

At this point, if this should take place, we will get a better sense of Hezbollah's broader capabilities. Its forward troops seemed to be extremely competent. Whether troops in other areas are equally capable remains to be seen. Also remaining to be seen is the effect of the Israeli air campaign on the militants' numbers, morale and coordination. If they are an effective fighting force, we would expect effective attacks against armored columns using anti-tank weapons and mines, and a slow evolution. If they are severely weakened, as some reports we are receiving from Lebanon say they are, the attack will be broader.

Remember that in our view Hezbollah does not expect to defeat Israel's main force, but wants to draw it into Lebanon to impose an Iraqi/Afghan style insurgency. Therefore, an apparent collapse of Hezbollah (as with the Taliban and Saddam Hussein's forces) does not necessarily mean defeat but rather can mean a shift to insurgency rather than conventional resistance. As the IDF statement makes clear, Israel does not intend to occupy and expose itself to such actions. It should also be remembered that both within and outside of Lebanon, Hezbollah has historically used terror techniques to impose penalties on enemies and shape the political environment. Hezbollah pioneered suicide bombing in Lebanon during the 1980s.

In conclusion, we do not have definitive intelligence that Israel has shifted to a radical new course. This could simply be another phase in a piecemeal operation. However, given Israeli practice in the past and political disputes within the Israeli government, we regard it as reasonable to alert our readers to the possibility of the beginning phases of a major, more traditional Israeli ground offensive designed to destroy Hezbollah in detail. We will know more clearly over the next 12 hours.

A brief visual history of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
[in terms of maps showing territorial changes]

I thought I would provide a few maps and some commentary
to show how the situation on the ground has changed over the years.

The first detailed partition plan was the Peel Commission in 1936

It provided for a small Jewish state in the areas with a Jewish majority

( Map )

The Peel report was not liked by either the Jews or the Arabs but the Jews agreed to it (not seeing that they had much choice) and the Arabs decided they had a better choice after all. This better choice became known as the "Great Uprising" which was an extended series of riots and violence lasting from 1936-1939

-

The next plan which came out was the 1947 UN Partition plan. As you can see in the map below, it awarded a substantially larger portion of the land to the Jews than the Peel Commission did.

( Map )

As with the Peel Commission report, the Jews accepted the UN plan and declared statehood based upon those borders, the Arabs however still felt they could do better and shortly after May 14th, 1948, approximately 1,000 Lebanese, 5,000 Syrian, 5,000 Iraqi, 10,000 Egyptian and 4,000 Transjordanian troops invaded the newly-established state. They were aided by corps of volunteers from Saudi Arabia, Libya and Yemen.

On May 15th, 1948 the Arab League Secretary-General, Abdul Razek Azzam Pasha, said, "This will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades".

Fortunately for Israel, the outcome turned out a little differently, and the borders were set in a 1949 armistice see map below)

( Map )

Unfortunately the Arabs still felt violence was the best way to obtain their goals. This would lead to the 1967 war, commonly known as The Six Day war. In the Six Day war 50,000 Israeli troops (and 214,000 reservists) and 197 combat aircraft battled against 280,000 Allied Arab troops and 812 combat aircraft.

The result was a resounding Arab defeat and Israel had seized the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank of the Jordan River (including East Jerusalem), and the Golan Heights.

Overall, Israel's territory grew by a factor of 3, including about one million Arabs placed under Israel's direct control in the newly captured territories. Israel's strategic depth grew to at least 300 kilometers in the south, 60 kilometers in the east and 20 kilometers of extremely rugged terrain in the north, a security asset that would prove useful in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War six years later.

On June 19, 1967, the National Unity Government [of Israel] voted unanimously to return the Sinai to Egypt and the Golan Heights to Syria in return for peace agreements. The Golan would have to be demilitarized and special arrangement would be negotiated for the Straits of Tiran. The government also resolved to open negotiations with King Hussein of Jordan regarding the Eastern border.

Later at the Khartoum Arab Summit, Arab leaders announced what came to be known as "the three nos" of Arab-Israel relations.

1. No peace with Israel
2. No recognition of Israel
3. No negotiations with Israel

What followed next was called the " War of Attrition" fought from 1968 to 1970 between Israel and Egypt It was initiated by Egypt as a way to regain territory lost to Israel in the Six Day War. A ceascease fire signed in 1970 with the borders at the same place as when the war started in 1968.

The Arabs still felt that violence was the solution to their designs, despite repeated Israeli offers to trade conquered land for a negotiated peace. This would lead to the 1973 War, commonly referred to as the "Yom Kippur War" in which a coalition of armies including Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq launched a surprised invasion of Israel.

The invasion was launched on October 6th, 1973 which was the Jewish Holiday of Yom Kippur. For those unfamiliar with the holiday, it is known as the "Day of Atonement" an annual holiday on which Jews fast for 25 hours (sunset the evening before to sunset of the day itself) and attend prayer services in atonement for their sins.

During the first 24-48 hours, the situation looked very grim for Israel, as the Arab armies gained substantial ground. In the Golan, 188 Israeli tanks fought a holding action against 2000 invading Syrian tanks. In the end, Israeli forces held against repeated assaults and drove forward capturing additional Arab land.

On the Syrian front, Israeli forces took another 20 square miles of Syrian Territory coming within 25 miles of Damascus.

On the Egyptian front, Israeli forces retook nearly all of the Sinai, and established a substantial beach head on the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal. In doing so, they cut off the entire Egyptian 3rd Army. At this point the US intervened on behalf of the Egyptians in order to prevent the Israelis from destroying the Egyptian 3rd Army. (see map below, the Egyptian 3rd army was entirely cut off and surrounded in the lower of the two red areas).

( Map )

The US saw this as an opportunity to push the Egyptians out of the Soviet sphere of influence, and they were correct. The US was able to extend their influence in Egypt and negotiate peace between Israel and Egypt.

The peace agreement signed at Camp David in 1978 provided a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, formal diplomatic recognition and ties (Egypt became the first Arab country to recognize Israel and establish an embassy there, and was the only Arab country to do so until Jordan signed a peace treaty in 1994, an event which I was present in Israel for). The price for peace was a return of all Egyptian lands conquered by Israel in 1967 & 1973.

The borders after the Camp David Accords are essentially the current borders that we see today (see map below)

( Map )

The first four of these maps show the result of Arab attempts to use violence to solve the Israel-Arab conflict. In every case it resulted in the loss of Arab lands to Israel.

The last two maps show the results of peaceful negotiations with Israel.

So I ask you, if you were an Arab leader -

Which approach do you think is most likely to achieve the goals of your people?

Which approach would you use?

Violence or Negotiation?

The ground war has begun. Several Israeli brigades now appear to be operating between the Lebanese border and the Litani River. According to reports, Hezbollah forces are dispersed in multiple bunker complexes and are launching rockets from these and other locations.

Hezbollah's strategy appears to be threefold. First, force Israel into costly attacks against prepared fortifications. Second, draw Israeli troops as deeply into Lebanon as possible, forcing them to fight on extended supply lines. Third, move into an Iraqi-style insurgency from which Israel -- out of fear of a resumption of rocket attacks -- cannot withdraw, but which the Israelis also cannot endure because of extended long-term casualties. This appears to have been a carefully planned strategy, built around a threat to Israeli cities that Israel can't afford. The war has begun at Hezbollah's time and choosing.

Israel is caught between three strategic imperatives. First, it must end the threat to Israeli cities, which must involve the destruction of Hezbollah's launch capabilities south of the Litani River. Second, it must try to destroy Hezbollah's infrastructure, which means it must move into the Bekaa Valley and as far as the southern suburbs of Beirut. Third, it must do so in such a way that it is not dragged into a long-term, unsustainable occupation against a capable insurgency.

Hezbollah has implemented its strategy by turning southern Lebanon into a military stronghold, consisting of well-designed bunkers that serve both as fire bases and launch facilities for rockets. The militants appear to be armed with anti-tank weapons and probably anti-aircraft weapons, some of which appear to be of American origin, raising the question of how they were acquired. Hezbollah wants to draw Israel into protracted fighting in this area in order to inflict maximum casualties and to change the psychological equation for both military and political reasons.

Israelis historically do not like to fight positional warfare. Their tendency has been to bypass fortified areas, pushing the fight to the rear in order to disrupt logistics, isolate fortifications and wait for capitulation. This has worked in the past. It is not clear that it will work here. The great unknown is the resilience of Hezbollah's fighters. To this point, there is no reason to doubt it. Israel could be fighting the most resilient and well-motivated opposition force in its history. But the truth is that neither Israel nor Hezbollah really knows what performance will be like under pressure.

Simply occupying the border-Litani area will not achieve any of Israel's strategic goals. Hezbollah still would be able to use rockets against Israel. And even if, for Hezbollah, this area is lost, its capabilities in the Bekaa Valley and southern Beirut will remain intact. Therefore, a battle that focuses solely on the south is not an option for Israel, unless the Israelis feel a defeat here will sap Hezbollah's will to resist. We doubt this to be the case.

The key to the campaign is to understand that Hezbollah has made its strategic decisions. It will not be fighting a mobile war. Israel has lost the strategic initiative: It must fight when Hezbollah has chosen and deal with Hezbollah's challenge. However, given this, Israel does have an operational choice. It can move in a sequential fashion, dealing first with southern Lebanon and then with other issues. It can bypass southern Lebanon and move into the rear areas, returning to southern Lebanon when it is ready. It can attempt to deal with southern Lebanon in detail, while mounting mobile operations in the Bekaa Valley, in the coastal regions and toward south Beirut, or both at the same time.

There are resource and logistical issues involved. Moving simultaneously on all three fronts will put substantial strains on Israel's logistical capability. An encirclement westward on the north side of the Litani, followed by a move toward Beirut while the southern side of the Litani is not secured, poses a serious challenge in re-supply. Moving into the Bekaa means leaving a flank open to the Syrians. We doubt Syria will hit that flank, but then, we don't have to live with the consequences of an intelligence failure. Israel will be sending a lot of force on that line if it chooses that method. Again, since many roads in south Lebanon will not be secure, that limits logistics.

Israel is caught on the horns of a dilemma. Hezbollah has created a situation in which Israel must fight the kind of war it likes the least -- attritional, tactical operations against prepared forces -- or go to the war it prefers, mobile operations, with logistical constraints that make these operations more difficult and dangerous. Moreover, if it does this, it increases the time during which Israeli cities remain under threat. Given clear failures in appreciating Hezbollah's capabilities, Israel must take seriously the possibility that Hezbollah has longer-ranged, anti-personnel rockets that it will use while under attack.

Israel has been trying to break the back of Hezbollah resistance in the south through air attack, special operations and probing attacks. This clearly hasn't worked thus far. That does not mean it won't work, as Israel applies more force to the problem and starts to master the architecture of Hezbollah's tactical and operational structure; however, Israel can't count on a rapid resolution of that problem.

The Israelis have by now thought the problem through. They don't like operational compromises -- preferring highly focused solutions at the center of gravity of an enemy. Hezbollah has tried to deny Israel a center of gravity and may have succeeded, forcing Israel into a compromise position. Repeated assaults against prepared positions are simply not something the Israelis can do, because they cannot afford casualties. They always have preferred mobile encirclement or attacks at the center of gravity of a defensive position. But at this moment, viewed from the outside, this is not an option.

An extended engagement in southern Lebanon is the least likely path, in our opinion. More likely -- and this is a guess -- is a five-part strategy:

1. Insert airmobile and airborne forces north of the Litani to seal the rear of Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon. Apply air power and engineering forces to reduce the fortifications, and infantry to attack forces not in fortified positions. Bottle them up, and systematically reduce the force with limited exposure to the attackers.

2. Secure roads along the eastern flank for an armored thrust deep into the Bekaa Valley to engage the main Hezbollah force and infrastructure there. This would involve a move from Qiryat Shimona north into the Bekaa, bypassing the Litani to the west, and would probably require sending airmobile and special forces to secure the high ground. It also would leave the right flank exposed to Syria.

3. Use air power and special forces to undermine Hezbollah capabilities in the southern Beirut area. The Israelis would consider a move into this area after roads through southern Lebanon are cleared and Bekaa relatively secured, moving into the area, only if absolutely necessary, on two axes of attack.

4. Having defeated Hezbollah in detail, withdraw under a political settlement shifting defense responsibility to the Lebanese government.

5. Do all of this while the United States is still able to provide top cover against diplomatic initiatives that will create an increasingly difficult international environment.

There can be many variations on this theme, but these elements are inevitable:

1. Hezbollah cannot be defeated without entering the Bekaa Valley, at the very least.

2. At some point, resistance in southern Lebanon must be dealt with, regardless of the cost.

3. Rocket attacks against northern Israel and even Tel Aviv must be accepted while the campaign unfolds.

4. The real challenge will come when Israel tries to withdraw.

No. 4 is the real challenge. Destruction of Hezbollah's infrastructure does not mean annihilation of the force. If Israel withdraws, Hezbollah or a successor organization will regroup. If Israel remains, it can wind up in the position the United States is in Iraq. This is exactly what Hezbollah wants. So, Israel can buy time, or Israel can occupy and pay the cost. One or the other.

The other solution is to shift the occupational burden to another power that is motivated to prevent the re-emergence of an anti-Israeli military force -- as that is what Hezbollah has become. The Lebanese government is the only possible alternative, but not a particularly capable one, reflecting the deep rifts in Lebanon.

Israel has one other choice, which is to extend the campaign to defeat Syria as well. Israel can do this, but the successor regime to Syrian President Bashar al Assad likely would be much worse for Israel than al Assad has been. Israel can imagine occupying Syria; it can't do it. Syria is too big and the Arabs have learned from the Iraqis how to deal with an occupation. Israel cannot live with a successor to al Assad and it cannot take control of Syria. It will have to live with al Assad. And that means an occupation of Lebanon would always be hostage to Syrian support for insurgents.

Hezbollah has dealt Israel a difficult hand. It has thought through the battle problem as well as the political dimension carefully. Somewhere in this, there has been either an Israeli intelligence failure or a political failure to listen to intelligence. Hezbollah's capabilities have posed a problem for Israel that allowed Hezbollah to start a war at a time and in a way of its choosing. The inquest will come later in Israel. And Hezbollah will likely be shattered regardless of its planning. The correlation of forces does not favor it. But if it forces Israel not only to defeat its main force but also to occupy, Hezbollah will have achieved its goals.

Except for some touristy photos
this is probably all for the time being
at least until I recover the missing photos
[which hopefully are on budhaboy's computer]


Apple

( +8 )

We have been following developments in the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict closely for several days. At this writing, the air-rocket war continues to rage, but the Israeli ground offensive that we would have expected by now has not yet been launched. There is some speculation that it will not be launched -- that a combination of air operations and a diplomatic process will be sufficient, from Israel's point of view, to negate the need for a ground attack.

While the various processes grind their way along, it is time to review the situation.

The first point to bear in mind is that the crisis did not truly begin with the capture of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah. The kidnappings presented a serious problem for Israel, but could not, by themselves, define the geopolitical issue. That definition came when Hezbollah rockets struck Haifa, Israel's third-largest city, on July 13. There were also claims coming from Hezbollah, and confirmed by Israeli officials, that Hezbollah had missiles available that could reach Tel Aviv. Israel's population is concentrated in the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem corridor and in the Tel Aviv-Haifa corridor. In effect, Hezbollah had attained the ability to strike at the Israeli heartland. Hezbollah has been hitting the northern part of this heartland, as well as pounding Israel's northern frontier.

The capture of two soldiers posed a symbolic challenge to Israel, but the rocket attacks posed a direct geopolitical threat. Israel had substantial room for maneuver regarding the captured troops. The threat to the heartland, however, could not be evaded. To the extent possible, Israel had to stop the missile attacks. As important, it also had to eliminate Hezbollah's ability to resume such attacks. The Israelis can tolerate these strikes for a certain period of time, so long as the outcome is a final cessation. What was not an option for Israel was to engage in temporary solutions that would allow Hezbollah to attack the heartland regularly, at its discretion. Hezbollah has posed a problem that Israel cannot choose to ignore.



Hezbollah's reasons for doing so at this time are not altogether clear. It certainly has to do with the crisis in Palestinian politics: Hezbollah wants to stake a place for itself as Palestine redefines itself. It also has to do with the vacuum created by the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon and freedom of action for Hezbollah that previously has been denied it by the Syrians. Finally, it is clear that Iranian and Shiite politics within the wider Islamic world have made Hezbollah action at this time attractive for the group's Iranian patrons.

However complex Hezbollah's motives might be, the consequences of its actions are crystal-clear: From the Israeli perspective, it is imperative that the rocket attacks must be shut down.

Israel's Imperfect Options

Israel has three tools at its disposal.

One is diplomacy. There is a general consensus, even among many in Lebanon and Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, that Hezbollah's actions have been unreasonable and undesirable. It would not be too difficult, we would think, to create a circumstance in which the two Israeli soldiers are released, a cease-fire is declared and an international monitoring team inserted into the region. That is what the French, for example, have proposed, and what is being discussed now.

The problem with this option, from the Israeli point of view, is that it puts off a solution to the deeper problem posed by Hezbollah to a later day -- one that might not be so advantageous for Israel. Israel has a built-in distrust of international peacekeeping operations -- dating back to May 1967, when the United Nations, without consulting Israel, withdrew peacekeepers from Sinai at the behest of the Egyptians. This cultural bias against peacekeepers is reinforced by the fact that Hezbollah could rearm itself behind the peacekeeping shield. Whether the peacekeepers would conduct operations to prevent this -- in effect, carrying out counterinsurgency operations in Lebanon in support of Israel's goals -- is doubtful in the extreme. Instead, the presence of a peacekeeping force might facilitate a more substantial Hezbollah capability down the road. This is, at least, how the Israelis think of it, and their position therefore has been consistent: The outcome of this conflict must be the destruction of Hezbollah, or at least its offensive capability, for an extended period of time.

That leads to Israel's other two options, both of which would be carried out with military force.

The first step has been the Israeli air campaign. All modern military operations by advanced powers begin with air campaigns. Their purpose is to prepare the battlefield for land attack and, in some cases, to force a political settlement. In Kosovo, for example, air attacks alone were sufficient to convince the Yugoslav government to concede its control over Kosovo. In the case of Desert Storm, the air campaign came in preparation for a ground attack.

Air forces around the world like to make extravagant claims as to what air power can do; the Israeli air force is no exception. However, while an air campaign can severely hamper Hezbollah -- particularly by attacking launch sites and storage facilities, and generally making launches difficult -- the likelihood that air power can, by itself, eliminate the threat is unlikely.

To reiterate a key point, the nature of the threat is continual attacks on Israel's geopolitical heartland. Now, it is possible that Israeli air operations could force some sort of political settlement, but again, as with the diplomatic option, it is difficult to conceive of a political settlement that guarantees what Israel wants. Even a Hezbollah withdrawal from southern Lebanon, coupled with occupation of the area by the Lebanese army, does not solve the problem. This solution assumes that the Lebanese army has the will and ability to prevent Hezbollah's return. For this to work, the Lebanese army would have to agree to dismantle Hezbollah's infrastructure, and Hezbollah would have to agree to let them do so -- and Israel would have to place its faith in both Hezbollah and the Lebanese army and government. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which the Israelis can reach a satisfactory political settlement. The air campaign as a political tool suffers from the same defect as the diplomatic track: It is of value only if Israel is prepared to accept a solution that does not guarantee a complete end to the threat posed by Hezbollah -- and potentially might leave the Israelis in a worse position, militarily, down the road.

There is an additional political fact and problem. Obviously, any threat to a heartland generates a unique political response. In Israel, the Olmert government is heir to Ariel Sharon's quest for an imposed political settlement on the Palestinians. This is a strategy opposed from the right, by Benjamin Netanyahu of Likud, who argues that any settlement that leaves military options in the hands of the Palestinians is unsustainable. The Hezbollah issue is the Palestinian issue on steroids. If Olmert were to agree to any settlement that does not include dismantling Hezbollah's capabilities or that relies on a third party to police that dismantling, Netanyahu would attack hard -- and we suspect that enough of Olmert's coalition would defect to force a political crisis in Israel.

There has been no attack from Netanyahu, however. This can be partly explained by the Israeli tradition that politics stops when war begins. But we suspect this goes deeper than that. Olmert is keeping Netanyahu informed as to his intentions and Netanyahu is content with the course being pursued, making it clear in public that his support depends on the government faithfully pursuing that course -- meaning the destruction of Hezbollah as an organized entity. Olmert does not have much room for maneuver on this, nor is it apparent that he wants any. The goal is the destruction of Hezbollah; anything less would not work, on any level, for Israel.

The Logic for a Ground Offensive

From this, we must conclude that the air campaign comes in preparation for what is Israel's third option: a ground offensive. If Israel's goal is the destruction of Hezbollah's ability to strike the Israeli heartland for an extended period of time, the only way to hope to achieve this is from the ground. Those conducting air operations can see only what can be seen from the air. And even if they can hit whatever they see, eliminating the threat requires a ground presence. Therefore, we continue to believe that logic and evidence argue for an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon -- and that any possible diplomatic or political resolution, however tempting, ultimately could not satisfy Israel's security requirements.

When we say invasion, we do not mean occupation. Israel has had its fill of counterinsurgency operations in Lebanon. This would be a raid in force. A large force would push into Lebanon, with two missions: the destruction of Hezbollah as an army and the location and destruction of all heavy weaponry. This solution would not be permanent, but it would achieve two ends. First, it would mean that for Hezbollah or a successor organization to regroup would take years. Second, it would leave no third party shielding Hezbollah while it regrouped. This strategy gives Israel what it wants now and options in the future.

Three more Israeli battalions were mobilized today. The United States, which certainly knows Israel's intentions, is now extracting U.S. citizens from Beirut. Israeli aircraft are working over Hezbollah positions in the Bekaa Valley. The United States, Israel's patron, is clearly in favor of the destruction of Hezbollah and there is no broad-based opposition to an Israeli offensive internationally. It is a window of opportunity that Israel will not pass up. The very thing that makes diplomatic solutions possible also makes invasion, for the Israelis, attractive.

Our analysis therefore runs as follows:

1. Only an invasion on the ground can provide Israel with the solution it wants to the threat Hezbollah has posed.

2. A diplomatic or political settlement not only cannot guarantee this outcome, but it would make later Israeli responses to Hezbollah even more difficult. Israel has more room for maneuver internationally now than it will have later.

3. The internal politics of Israel will make it very difficult for Olmert to come out of this with a less-than-definitive outcome.

4. Israel will seek to deal with Hezbollah without undertaking counterinsurgency operations in the long term. This means attack, sterilization of the threat, and withdrawal.

There has been much speculation about diplomatic solutions, the possibility that there will not be an invasion, and so on. But when we ignore the rhetoric and look at the chessboard, it is difficult to see how this conflict ends without some action on the ground. When we examine the behavior of the Israelis, they are taking the steps that would be needed for an invasion. Obviously we could be wrong, and clearly the invasion has not come at the earliest possible moment, as we had predicted. Nevertheless, when we step through the logic, we keep coming out with the same answer: invasion.

There is increasing discussion of a cease-fire between Israel and Lebanon. French Prime Minister Dominic de Villepin is in Beirut to discuss it. The Israelis say they are talking to the Italians about it, and even the Iranians have said that they favor a cease-fire. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said today, "A reasonable and just solution must be found to end this crisis. A cease-fire and then a swap is achievable." That is quite a distance for the Iranians to have gone.

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert listed three demands for a cease-fire: first, the release of captured soldiers; second, an end to rocket attacks on Israel; and third, the deployment of Lebanese Army troops along the Israeli-Lebanese border. Other diplomats have been talking about an international force along the border.

The first two demands can easily be met. It is the third one that will be the sticking point because it goes to the heart of the issue. When Israel talks of the Lebanese Army being deployed there, it is saying two things. The first is that it doesn't trust an international force containing troops from countries like Russia and France. It does not believe they will be neutral. Second, if a Lebanese force is deployed, it must be able to impose its will on Hezbollah, through military action if possible.

The problem is that the Lebanese Army is not in a position, politically or militarily, to control Hezbollah. If it could do so, it would have. Moreover, if the army were able to impose its will, Hezbollah would cease to be an effective group. Hezbollah's power comes from its military capabilities and autonomy. Israel's demand would represent the end of Hezbollah in its current form. Israel does not trust a suspension of Hezbollah attacks; they believe the militants will strike again unless someone can guarantee otherwise. Israel's call for a Lebanese force that can impose its will on Hezbollah is a contradiction in terms. It is an offer of a cease-fire that can't be delivered.

Israel is, however, interested in continuing the diplomatic process. Its reasoning can be seen from reports Stratfor has received from sources close to Hezbollah. They have said that Hezbollah is maintaining its attacks on Israel because the militants want Israel to attack them on the ground sooner rather than later. Over time, they fear, Hezbollah's ability to resist Israeli attack will be undermined by airstrikes. The militants' command and control, communications, weapons stockpiles and morale will be undermined. On the other hand, if Israel were to attack now, Hezbollah's leadership is confident that it could impose losses on Israeli troops that would be unacceptable. That is what the militants want to achieve -- they want to engage Israel as the first Arab force that, even if it can't win in the end, can severely damage the Israel Defense Forces.

If that is actually Hezbollah's thinking -- and that would explain their behavior -- then we can also better understand Israeli thinking. If the airstrikes are hurting Hezbollah's morale and infrastructure, there is no reason to hurry in on the ground. It makes more sense to let the current situation continue even if it means further attacks on Israeli targets. In the meantime, Tel Aviv can engage in diplomatic initiatives that will reposition Israel in the international system. Rather than resisting diplomatic efforts, Israel is participating, setting demands that appear extremely reasonable while being unattainable. While that game goes on, so does the air war and the undermining of Hezbollah's core strength.

The problem is that Hezbollah can see this happening. That means it must try to increase its attacks to create a political crisis in Israel. Olmert is under a microscope. There is suspicion that he will be sucked into a diplomatic solution that will not only not deal with the Hezbollah threat, but also make it impossible to attack the militants later if they resume attacks. In this scenario, an international presence is forced on Israel, Hezbollah resumes attacks without the international force taking decisive action, and Israel is forced to either do nothing or attack through the international force.

In other words, there is a trap for Israel in all of this. If it gets too clever on the diplomatic side, it can wind up in trouble. On the other hand, a diplomatic process gives Israel time to do what Hezbollah wants least: an air war designed to impose attrition on them.

We have not expected the Israelis to accept bombardment for as long as they have. However, if Hezbollah's view is correct, it is good military strategy and the Israeli public will accept that. It may force Hezbollah to make serious concessions under pressure to preserve the cohesiveness of its force. But if the diplomatic game results in extended attacks on Israel without action, or results in a cease-fire that does not preclude a resumption of attacks, then Olmert will come under dramatic pressure and will lose his room for maneuver.

Olmert knows this, of course. He has managed the internal politics skillfully to this point. He can probably play diplomatic games for another 48 hours by implying military necessity to his Cabinet. But then it starts to become very dicey politically. And by then, Hezbollah's attacks will have become intolerable, and attacking -- whatever the condition of Hezbollah -- will become essential.

Neither an international force nor the Lebanese Army (with its current capabilities) protecting Israel from Hezbollah attacks will fly in Israel.