More captivating than a train wreck

more fun than clubbing baby seals
with other baby seals

all of you must see

The Most Unromantic Man in the World

a romantic comedy that will leave you
laughing
crying
sick to your stomach
and
desperately needing a shower

The shadows in my mind

Shadows dancing
flickering
haunting the corners of my mind
my soul
Mists
erie secret silent mists
veiling the visions of my heart
of my mind
bright flashes of consciousness
of clarity
a piercing light
briefly, painfully illuminating
swiftly slicing through the mist
dispersing shadows
forcing me to see myself with absolutely devastating clarity
the depths of my broken battered soul
the hell of my morally destitute life
and the comically sadistic beast which resides within me
yet simultaneously casing new shadows of doubt
and
finished with this bout of self-persecution
leaves me alone with my insane revelations
which perhaps are but the reflections of my dissipating sanity
skewed masochistically by my minds cruel intellect
leaving me twisting in the torturous winds of my life
screaming in the intense pleasure of everyday sensations
unable to escape
wishing to crawl into the sanctimonious safety of the shadows
and feebly grasp that false sense of security that is found within.

To the love of my life, My dearest lady death

death
waiting
expecting
expecting my life
eager to experience this tender young flesh
to devour the minuscule remains of my soul
she smiles and picks her teeth
waiting patiently
for my release from this world
a world of masochistic desire
for the unyielding fruit of false dreams
when
I shall enter the protective folds of her obsidian gown
embracing her with my lifelong collection
of frustrations unrelenting
of hopes basely crushed
of undying fruitless loves
pleading for the sanctity of her blasphemous love
praying that she shall grant me release
for all my worldly infatuations
grant me
that which I desire
to allow my malnourished soul
to fade forever into the final peace
of oblivion

Reflections of a truthful self

reflections
a mere image
a wealth of information within

my reflection is never truly seen
others see what they wish
but that is not me
tis but what their eyes blinded by their own fears see

yet I too am blind
to mine own reflection
also blinded by fear
fear of what I may find there

refusing to look clearly
for my hidden demons dance freely
joyously
taunting me to see them
dancing in grim mockery with my skeletal armies

in my reflection
my deepest fears are written boldly across my chest
my strongest desires dangle in from of my face
daunting me
exasperating me
for my arms are tied
tied by my fears
unable to break free of these self-imposed sanctions
to reach for that which I crave

in my reflection
past loves
worn jaded necklaces dangle from my neck
a banner to suffering
an ode to misery
an invisible invitation to others
each daily encounter adding a bead to future necklaces

this jeweled crown upon my head
robbed time after time
each theft a life
each life a loved one departed

upon my hands
tarnished rings
each ring a life
a life taken before its light could fully shine

this noose hanging round my neck
grows ever tighter
as my days draw to an eternal close

I, a mere menagerie of these twisted reflections
carry on beneath this unbearable weight
entwined unknowingly with my reflection
unable to break free

for, in my reflection
I see nothing.

Battlefield of Dreams

Walking alone
in the battlefield of my dreams

long jagged scars mar my soul
new wounds bleed freely

my life drains slowly from them
dripping
dripping
pooling on the blood soaked earth
standing
clutching my sword
my sword of senseless reason

raising my shield
my shield of denial

wiping the pain, the fear, from my face
mocking true warriors
bracing myself to appear falsely strong

raising my shield
hindering my demons, jaws gnashing
eager to devour my soul

raising my sword
slashing at the demons that plague me
cutting through them they disappear
returning to my mind
where they were spawned

my energy spent
my will wasted
I fall to my knees
tears streak down my cheeks

I drop my sword
my shield

tonights battle finished
I fade into oblivion
already feeling the beast gnaw at my soul
I rest
only to fight
the same fight
night after night

Kiss me, Bite me, Suck my life

I plead silently to her as I lay there staring at my lonely reflection, feeling her cold hands press my flesh as one would a piece of meat before devouring it a piece at a time. Addicted to her touch, intoxicated by her smile, begging her to suck my life, her sustenance. Incapable of movement, held by her horrific beauty, her dark endless eyes and deathly pale skin. Long since having removed all protections from her fatal attractions, my chains from silver to gold, all signs of my religion so thoroughly washed from my home as to make me wonder if they had been there at all. The spice now gone from my palate has returned in abundance to the living of the last few days of my life. Night after night, I watch my reflection fade as she sucks my life, and infuses me with the cheap variation she calls her own. Until, a mere shadow of my former self, I leave the ranks of mortals for an eternity of damnation, trapped in my lifeless body. Yearning for the hunt.

Cease-Fire: Shaking Core Beliefs in the Middle East - from Stratfor

An extraordinary thing happened in the Middle East this month. An Israeli army faced an Arab army and did not defeat it -- did not render it incapable of continued resistance. That was the outcome in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982. But it did not happen in 2006. Should this outcome stand, it will represent a geopolitical earthquake in the region -- one that fundamentally shifts expectations and behaviors on all sides.

It is not that Hezbollah defeated the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). It did not. By most measures, it got the worst of the battle. Nevertheless, it has been left standing at the end of the battle. Its forces in the Bekaa Valley and in the Beirut area have been battered, though how severely is not yet clear. Its forces south of the Litani River were badly hurt by the Israeli attack. Nevertheless, the correlation of forces was such that the Israelis should have dealt Hezbollah, at least in southern Lebanon, a devastating blow, such that resistance would have crumbled. IDF did not strike such a blow -- so as the cease-fire took effect, Hezbollah continued to resist, continued to inflict casualties on Israeli troops and continued to fire rockets at Israel. Hezbollah has not been rendered incapable of continued resistance, and that is unprecedented.

In the regional equation, there has been an immutable belief: that, at the end of the day, IDF was capable of imposing a unilateral military solution on any Arab force. Israel might have failed to achieve its political goals in its various wars, but it never failed to impose its will on an enemy force. As a result, all neighboring nations and entities understood there were boundaries that could be crossed only if a country was willing to accept a crushing Israeli response. All neighboring countries -- Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, prior to the collapses of central authority -- understood this and shaped their behavior in view of it. Even when Egypt and Syria initiated war in 1973, it was with an understanding that their war aims had to be limited, that they had to accept the probability of defeat and had to focus on postwar political maneuvers rather than on expectations of victory.

The Egyptians withdrew from conflict and accepted the Sinai as a buffer zone, largely because 1973 convinced them that continued conflict was futile. Jordan, since 1970, has been effectively under the protection of Israel against threats from Syria and internal dangers as well. Syria has not directly challenged the Israelis since 1973, preferring indirect challenges and, not infrequently, accommodation with Israel. The idea of Israel as a regional superpower has been the defining principle.

In this conflict, what Hezbollah has achieved is not so much a defeat of Israel as a demonstration that destruction in detail is not an inevitable outcome of challenging Israel. Hezbollah has showed that it is possible to fight to a point that Israel prefers a cease-fire and political settlement to a military victory followed by political accommodation. Israel might not have lost any particular battle, and a careful analysis of the outcome could prove its course to be reasonable. But the loss of the sense -- and historical reality -- of the inevitability of Israeli military victory is a far more profound defeat for Israel, as this clears the way for other regional powers to recalculate risks.

Hezbollah's Preparations

Hezbollah meticulously prepared for the war by analyzing Israeli strengths and weaknesses. Israel is casualty-averse by dint of demographics. It therefore resorts to force multipliers such as air power and armor, combined with excellent reconnaissance and tactical intelligence. Israel uses mobility to cut lines of supply and air power to shatter centralized command-and-control, leaving enemy forces disorganized, unbalanced and unsupplied.

Hezbollah sought to deny Israel its major advantages. The group created a network of fortifications in southern Lebanon that did not require its fighters to maneuver and expose themselves to Israeli air power. Hezbollah stocked those bunkers so fighters could conduct extended combat without the need for resupply. It devolved command to the unit level, making it impossible for a decapitation strike by Israel to affect the battlefield. It worked in such a way that, while the general idea of the defense architecture was understood by Israeli military intelligence, the kind of detailed intelligence used -- for example, in 1967 -- was denied the Israelis. Hezbollah acquired anti-tank weapons from Syria and Iran that prevented Israeli armor from operating without prior infantry clearing of anti-tank teams. And by doing that, the group forced the Israelis to accept casualties in excess of what could, apparently, be tolerated. In short, it forced the Israelis to fight Hezbollah's type of war, rather than the other way around.

Hezbollah then initiated war at the time and place of its choosing. There has been speculation that Israel planned for such a war. That might be the case, but it is self-evident that, if the Israelis wanted this war, they were not expecting it when it happened. The opening of the war was not marked by the capture of two Israeli soldiers. Rather, it was the persistent and intense bombardment of Israel with missiles -- including attacks against Israel's third-largest city, Haifa -- that compelled the Israelis to fight at a moment when they obviously were unprepared for war, and could not clearly decide either their war aims or strategy. In short, Hezbollah applied a model that was supposed to be Israel's forte: The group prepared meticulously for a war and launched it when the enemy was unprepared for it.

Hezbollah went on the strategic offensive and tactical defensive. It created a situation in which Israeli forces had to move to the operational and tactical offensive at the moment of Hezbollah's highest level of preparedness. Israel could not decline combat, because of the rocket attacks against Haifa, nor was it really ready for war -- particularly psychologically. The Israelis fought when Hezbollah chose and where Hezbollah chose. Their goals were complex, where Hezbollah's were simple. Israel wanted to stop the rockets, break Hezbollah, suffer minimal casualties and maintain its image as an irresistible military force. Hezbollah merely wanted to survive the Israeli attack. The very complexity of Israel's war aims, hastily crafted as they were, represented a failure point.

The Foundations of Israeli Strategy

It is important to think through the reasoning that led to Israeli operations. Israel's actions were based on a principle promulgated by Ariel Sharon at the time of his leadership. Sharon argued that Israel must erect a wall between Israelis and Arabs. His reasoning stemmed from circumstances he faced during Israel's occupation of Lebanon: Counterinsurgency operations impose an unnecessary and unbearable cost in the long run, particularly when designed to protect peripheral interests. The losses may be small in number but, over the long term, they pose severe operational and morale challenges to the occupying force. Therefore, for Sharon, the withdrawal from Lebanon in the 1980s created a paradigm. Israel needed a national security policy that avoided the burden of counterinsurgency operations without first requiring a political settlement. In other words, Israel needed to end counterinsurgency operations by unilaterally ending the occupation and erecting a barrier between Israel and hostile populations.

The important concept in Sharon's thinking was not the notion of impenetrable borders. Rather, the important concept was the idea that Israel could not tolerate counterinsurgency operations because it could not tolerate casualties. Sharon certainly did not mean or think that Israel could not tolerate casualties in the event of a total conventional war, as in 1967 or 1973. There, extreme casualties were both tolerable and required. What he meant was that Israel could tolerate any level of casualties in a war of national survival but, paradoxically, could not tolerate low-level casualties in extended wars that did not directly involve Israel's survival.

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was Sharon's protege. Olmert was struggling with the process of disengagement in Gaza and looking toward the same in the West Bank. Lebanon, where Israel learned the costs of long-term occupation, was the last place he wanted to return to in July 2006. In his view, any operation in Lebanon would be tantamount to a return to counterinsurgency warfare and occupation. He did not recognize early on that Hezbollah was not fighting an insurgency, but rather a conventional war of fixed fortifications.

Olmert did a rational cost-benefit analysis. First, if the principle of the Gaza withdrawal was to be followed, the last place the Israelis wanted to be was in Lebanon. Second, though he recognized that the rocket attacks were intolerable in principle, he also knew that, in point of fact, they were relatively ineffective. The number of casualties they were causing, or were likely to cause, would be much lower than those that would be incurred with an invasion and occupation of Lebanon. Olmert, therefore, sought a low-cost solution to the problem of Hezbollah.

IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz offered an attractive alternative. Advocating what air force officers have advocated since the 1930s, Halutz launched an air campaign designed to destroy Hezbollah. It certainly hurt Hezbollah badly, particularly outside of southern Lebanon, where longer-range rocket launchers were located. However, in the immediate battlefield, limited tactical intelligence and the construction of the bunkers appear to have blunted the air attack. As Israeli troops moved forward across the border, they encountered a well-prepared enemy that undoubtedly was weakened but was not destroyed by the air campaign.

At this point, Olmert had a strategic choice to make. He could mount a multi-divisional invasion of Lebanon, absorb large numbers of casualties and risk being entangled in a new counterinsurgency operation, or he could seek a political settlement. He chose a compromise. After appearing to hesitate, he launched an invasion that seemed to bypass critical Hezbollah positions (isolating them), destroying other positions and then opting for a cease-fire that would transfer responsibility for security to the Lebanese army and a foreign peacekeeping force.

Viewed strictly from the standpoint of cost-benefit analysis, Olmert was probably right. Except that Hezbollah's threat to Israel proper had to be eliminated, Israel had no interests in Lebanon. The cost of destroying Hezbollah's military capability would have been extremely high, since it involved moving into the Bekaa Valley and toward Beirut -- let alone close-quarters infantry combat in the south. And even then, over time, Hezbollah would recover. Since the threat could be eliminated only at a high cost and only for a certain period of time, the casualties required made no sense.

This analysis, however, excluded the political and psychological consequences of leaving an enemy army undefeated on the battlefield. Again, do not overrate what Hezbollah did: The group did not conduct offensive operations; it was not able to conduct maneuver combat; it did not challenge the Israeli air force in the air. All it did was survive and, at the end of the war, retain its ability to threaten Israel with such casualties that Israel declined extended combat. Hezbollah did not defeat Israel on the battlefield. The group merely prevented Israel from defeating it. And that outcome marks a political and psychological triumph for Hezbollah and a massive defeat for Israel.

Implications for the Region

Hezbollah has demonstrated that total Arab defeat is not inevitable -- and with this demonstration, Israel has lost its tremendous psychological advantage. If an operational and tactical defensive need not end in defeat, then there is no reason to assume that, at some point, an Arab offensive operation need not end in defeat. And if the outcome can be a stalemate, there is no reason to assume that it cannot be a victory. If all things are possible, then taking risks against Israel becomes rational.

The outcome of this war creates two political crises.

In Israel, Olmert's decisions will come under serious attack. However correct his cost-benefit analysis might have been, he will be attacked over the political and psychological outcome. The entire legacy of Ariel Sharon -- the doctrine of disengagement -- will now come under attack. If Israel is thrown into political turmoil and indecision, the outcome on the battlefield will have been compounded politically.

There is now also a crisis in Lebanon and in the Muslim world. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has emerged as a massive political force. Even in the multi-confessional society, Hezbollah will be a decisive factor. Syria, marginalized in the region for quite a while, becomes more viable as Hezbollah's patron. Meanwhile, countries like Jordan and Egypt must reexamine their own assumptions about Israel. And in the larger Muslim world, Hezbollah's victory represents a victory for Iran and the Shia. Hezbollah, a Shiite force, has done what others could not do. This will profoundly effect the Shiite position in Iraq -- where the Shia, having first experienced the limits of American power, are now seeing the expanding boundaries of Iranian power.

We would expect Hezbollah, Syria and Iran to move rapidly to exploit what advantage this has given them, before it dissipates. This will increase pressures not only for Israel, but also for the United States, which is engaged in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in a vague confrontation with Iran. For the Israelis and the Americans, restabilizing their interests will be difficult.

Now, some would argue that Israel's possession of weapons of mass destruction negates the consequences of regional perception of weakness. That might be the case, but the fact is that Israel's possession of such weapons did not prevent attacks in 1973, nor were those weapons usable in this case. Consider the distances involved: Israeli forces have been fighting 10 miles from the border. And if Damascus were to be struck with the wind blowing the wrong way, northern Israel would be fried as well. Israel could undertake a nuclear strike against Iran, but the threat posed by Iran is indirect -- since it is far away -- and would not determine the outcome of any regional encounter. Certainly, the possession of nuclear weapons provides Israel a final line from which to threaten enemies -- but by the time that became necessary, the issue already would have shifted massively against Israel. Nuclear weapons have not been used since World War II -- in spite of many apparent opportunities to do so -- because, as a weapon, the utility is more apparent than real. Possession of nuclear weapons can help guarantee regime survival, but not, by itself, military success.

As it stands, logic holds that, given the tenuous nature of the cease-fire, casus belli on Israel's part can be found and the war reinitiated. Given the mood in Israel, logic would dictate the fall of Olmert, his replacement by a war coalition and an attempt to change the outcome. But logic has not applied to Israeli thinking during this war. We have been consistently surprised by the choices Israel has made, and it is not clear whether this is simply Olmert's problem or one that has become embedded in Israel.

What is clear is that, if the current outcome stands, it will mean there has been a tremendous earthquake in the Middle East. It is cheap and easy to talk about historic events. But when a reality that has dominated a region for 58 years is shattered, it is historic. Perhaps this paves the way to new wars. Perhaps Olmert's restraint opens the door for some sort of stable peace. But from where we sit, he was sufficiently aggressive to increase hostility toward Israel without being sufficiently decisive to achieve a desired military outcome.

Hezbollah and Iran hoped for this outcome, though they did not really expect it. They got it. The question on the table now is what they will do with it.

By George Friedman

Ok so its not bad poetry

but
its from the same time in my life
and
is similarly bizarre

its just an old memory I do not want to lose
even if it is probably better off forgotten

---

A diary entry from years ago
perhaps only significant because
it was finding this same entry
which prompted me
to start this journal

---

6:35am

I broke up with J. Whatever was bothering me kinda came to a head, I also sensed she wasn't happy in the relationship either. Later that night I was flirting with A, trying to be good, really I was, but no such luck, we made out for a while, then I bailed and C spent the night at my place. The next night A and I slept together.

The night after that had A, L & D over, they got into a fight because D didnt like seeing me flirt with both A and L, though he will only admit that L bothered him, D stormed off.

A, L and I had a long chat and kinda came to the realization that D had been sleeping with both of them, and I had been sleeping with A and fooling around with L. Slept with A a bunch over the next couple of days, then tues or maybe Weds of last week, I was at the exit and met G.

D was flirting with her, she took us down to the bikini store and tried on bikinis, I sold her to some guy for two cigarettes, anyway...

D, L, G & I ended up hanging at my place watching movies, L brough party snacks and condoms. Next morning/afternoon am laying naked in bed with G, when in through the window comes A ready to kill, says something about her movies and storms off into the TV room, gets her movies makes some comment and climbs back out the window.

G & I, well actually G decides to head down to the exit, to hopefully talk to S, her boyfriend, before A can. No such luck, as we come down the steps S's car roars around the corner and down the street, G freaks out, I tell her not to worry it will work itself out.

We walk down to the exit, She talks to S, I talk to S, I talk to EB, who finds the whole situation hilarious, or so he says though he is lying a little bit, but not completely.

I talk to A, I manage to get G a second chance with S, smooth things over with A and everythings cool, or so it seems. I take A home and fuck her, all seems normal. Well over the next couple of days S shows no interest in dealing with G, could not care less, not that I blame him of course.

A keeps bringing up minor discrepancies along the lines of "he said she said" etc. Finally it comes to a head in a cafe, and I lay it on the line, I told her that I didnt care about her that way. That I liked her as a person, enjoyed her company and respected her enough not to lie to her about my feelings. I said that I would not say whether what I did was right or wrong, or try to make any excuses for my actions. If she was interested in my thoughts I would be happy to share them but while I would prefer that she stayed the choice was hers completely.

She stared at me, with a look of hurt anger in her eyes for a couple of minutes as if deciding if she should be angry and storm out or sit down, take me home and fuck me, and then sat down.

Later that night we went home, G also spent the night.

The next day, we went down to a party down south, S ignored G, and fucked some other chick, I got to know F a little better, though resisted the temptation to kiss her, dont think I will next time, wouldnt mind fucking her at all.

oh yeah almost forgot, gave S a rough draft of my resume, his mom is gonna do it up all nice and he is going to give it to his manager.

I am going to the symphony with L and A tonight, should be fun... last tonight, I hung out with D, T, OJ, G, L & E, there's a possibility of something happening between E and I, but with women who knows, I'll leave it up to fate...

swiped from wudles

A fleeing Al Qaeda Guerilla, desperate for water, is plodding along, through the Iraqi desert, when he sees something far off in the distance.

Hoping to find water, he walks toward the object, only to find a little old Jewish man, at a small stand, selling neckties.

The Arab asks, "Do you have any water?"

The Jewish man replies, "I have no water. Would you like to buy a tie?

They are only $5.00.

The Arab shouts, "Idiot Jew! Israel should not exist! I do not need an overpriced tie. I need water! I should kill you, but I must find water first.

"OK", says the old Jew, "it does not matter that you do not want to buy a tie and that you hate me. I will show you that I am bigger than that. If you continue over that hill, to the east, for about two miles, you will find a lovely restaurant. It has all the water you need. Shalom."

Muttering, the Arab staggers off, over the hill.

Several hours later he staggers back, near collapse, from exhaustion. With deep animosity he says, "Your brother won't let me in without a tie."